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Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal 
Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for 
Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents 
MELANIE B. JACOBSt 
The tanker truck barreled through a blind intersection on a 
country road near Oklahoma City and smashed broadside into 
Nancy Springer's blue Subaru. 
Nancy survived for only a few minutes. Her thirteen year-old 
son, Micah ... [was] airlifted to a nearby hospital. 
Micah had no father, but he told the hospital authorities 
repeatedly that he did have another mother-Nancy's former 
partner, who lived in Berkeley [California]. 
No one listened. No one dialed the phone numbers in California 
he kept giving them. Before Micah was taken to surgery for a 
badly broken left arm, he was already a ward of the court and on 
his way to becoming a foster child. 
Micki Graham heard about the accident late that night when a 
Berkeley cop knocked on her door with the number of a children's 
hospital chaplain in Oklahoma. 
"Mom," Micah said as Micki swept into his hospital room [the 
next] afternoon. "You got here." 
But a judge had ruled six years earlier that, in the eyes of the 
law, Micki Graham wasn't mom. Now, in an Oklahoma hospital, 
that ruling meant that as soon as Micah was well enough, some 
couple would be taking him. 1 
t Abraham L. Freedman Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Temple 
University School of Law. I would like to thank Professors Nancy Knauer and 
Richard Greenstein for their insightful comments on earlier drafts, Professor 
Barbara Cox for her thoughtful suggestions, and Jessica VanderVeen for her 
research assistance. I offer special thanks to Susan and Mark Jacobs and 
Charla McMillian for their love and encouragement. Copyright © 2002 Melanie 
B. Jacobs. 
1. Elaine Herscher, Family Circle, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1999, at 1Zl 
(recounting the facts underlying the case of Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. 
Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991». For further discussion of Nancy S., see infra Part 
lILB.I. 
341 
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INTRODUCTION 
Micah represents one of approximately ten million 
children being raised by same-sex parents in the United 
States.2 While our country is undergoing a "gayby boom',a 
and a growing number of children will be raised in "two 
mommy" households, our laws have not caught up with 
societal reality. Many lesbian couples are having children; 
but courts consider a child born to both a biological lesbian 
mother and a nonbiological lesbian mother ("lesbian 
coparent,,4) to have one legal parent5 and one legal 
stranger.6 Even though these lesbian couples jointly make 
the decision to have children, the party who is artificially 
inseminated is a legal parent because of her biological tie, 
while the other party has no legal parental role because of 
her lack of biological connection to the child.7 
This article addresses the status of a lesbian coparent 
who has made a decision with her partner to form a family, 
who often has participated in the artificial insemination 
process, and who has functioned in all ways as a parent, but 
2. According to recent estimates by the American Bar Association, as many 
as ten million children within the United States currently live in families with 
same-sex parents. Valerie Kellogg, How the Children of the Gay Baby Boom Are 
Faring, NEWSDAY, July 10, 2001, at BI0. 
3. See id.; see also Ilene Chaykin, Are Two Moms Better Than One?, Los 
ANGELES MAG., July 1, 2000 at 105 (discussing the unprecedented number of 
lesbian and gay parents). 
4. I use the term "lesbian coparent" to refer to a nonbiological or 
nonadoptive mother who is the committed, lesbian partner of a child's biological 
parent, who has fully participated in the decision to create a family, and who 
has functioned as a parent to the child. 
5. The term "parent" has traditionally been defined through biology or 
adoption. Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the 
New ALI Principles, 35 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 769, 771 (1999). 
6. See id. at 770-72. Shapiro notes that within the dualistic realm of parent 
and non-parent, a non-parent is often treated by courts as a legal stranger. Id. 
at 770. 
7. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other 
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 508 (1990) ("A legally unrecognized 
lesbian mother is currently forced into the legal status of nonparent, or third 
party, in custody or visitation disputes."). Thus, lesbian coparents, who have 
formed a family with the encouragement and agreement of their partner, are 
viewed as third parties-such as grandparents, aunts and uncles, stepparents, 
or foster parents-and not as a second parent, as in paternity or divorce cases. 
See also Karen Markey, Note, An Overview of the Legal Challenges Faced by 
Gay and Lesbian Parents: How Courts Treat the Growing Number of Gay 
Families, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 721, 723 (1998). 
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lacks legal recognition of her parenthood under existing 
laws.s Most courts currently employ third party visitation 
doctrine9 rather than a parental analytical framework when 
deciding custodial and visitation disputes involving a 
lesbian coparent. But this doctrine disadvantages lesbian 
coparents and is inadequate to meet their needs. I propose 
that courts use instead a statutory parental analytic 
framework-specifically, the Uniform Parentage Act 
("UP A" or the "Act,,)10_to adjudicate maternity for lesbian 
coparents, thereby conferring all of the rights and privileges 
of legal parenthood. Only by doing so will courts be able to 
fully protect the relationship between a child and her 
lesbian coparent. 
Recently, several courts have used equitable doctrines 
to maintain contact between lesbian coparents and their 
children, but those doctrines are inferior to the use of the 
Uniform Parentage Act. Part I of this article discusses in 
greater detail the existing dilemmas faced by many lesbian 
coparents, as well as provides background on the UPA and 
the potential for use of the UPA's maternity adjudication 
8. I have chosen to focus my analysis on this narrow class because much of 
the existing case law and literature concerns these women. There are many 
other same-sex parent paradigms that are beyond the scope of this piece. For 
example, this article does not examine the issues involving lesbian couples in 
which one woman is the gestational mother and her partner is the genetic 
mother. See, e.g., Ryiah Lilith, Note, The G.I.F.T. of Two Biological and Legal 
Mothers, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 207 (2001). Furthermore, I have 
chosen to focus on lesbian coparents rather than gay coparents because of the 
different legal issues involved; for example, an unknown sperm donor has no 
parental rights, whereas the parental status of a surrogate mother may be less 
clear. While the Uniform Parentage Act may arguably be used to adjudicate 
parentage within a multi-parental framework, see, e.g., Theresa Glennon, 
Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of 
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 57 (discussing Louisiana's recognition of three 
legal parents through acknowledgment of dual paternity, as well as decisions in 
two other states which appear similarly to open the door to recognition of dual 
paternity), this article uses a two-parent model to explore UPA application to a 
same-sex coparent. 
9. Third party visitation doctrine is predicated on the notion that a child has 
one mother and one father and that any other person occupies the less 
privileged legal position of third party. 
10. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 3, 21 (1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 106, 
201, 602 (2000). The UPA was originally promulgated in 1973 ("UPA 1973"), 
and substantially revised in 2000 ("UPA 2000"). Only Texas, however, has 
adopted UPA 2000. See 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 821. The provisions of UPA 1973 
are analyzed within this article's text; where appropriate, a brief analysis of 
UPA 2000 is provided in accompanying footnotes. 
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provision to address the problems. Through a series of case 
studies, Part II reviews the current jurisprudential trend of 
using third party equitable doctrines such as de facto and 
psychological parent as a basis of affording a lesbian 
coparent access to her child upon termination of a 
relationship with her child's biological mother. Part II 
further analyzes the deficiencies inherent in those equitable 
doctrines for establishing maternity and for clarifying 
standing. Part III examines both the statutory language of 
the UP A and cases involving the UPA to illustrate that the 
UP A can and should be used to adjudicate lesbian coparent 
maternity, thereby conferring upon lesbian coparents full 
parental rights. This article concludes that the UPA 
provides the most consistent method for resolving disputes 
between lesbian coparents and their former same-sex 
partners and the most expedient and reliable method for 
legalizing a full parental relationship for lesbian coparents 
with their children. 
1. BACKGROUND 
Parenthood is most often legally determined by biology 
or adoption. ll Furthermore, a child born to married parents 
is considered to have two legal parents. 12 Since same-sex 
couples cannot marry, two lesbians in a committed 
relationship, unlike their heterosexual counterparts, are 
not both considered the legal parents of a child born to their 
union. 13 Although a growing number of states permit a 
11. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 771. 
12. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 
(2000). 
13. No states currently permit same-sex partners to marry and thirty-five 
states expressly forbid it. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Map of 
Specific Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Laws in the U.S.-June 2001 (2001), available 
at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/marriagemap0601.gif (last accessed Dec. 8, 
2001); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(1) (West. Supp. 2001) ("Marriages 
between persons of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction. .. or 
relationships between persons of the same sex which are treated as marriages 
in any jurisdiction ... are not recognized for any purpose in this state."); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS Ann. § 551.1 (West Supp. 2001) ("Marriage is inherently a unique 
relationship between a man and a woman .... A marriage contracted between 
individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state."); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
1102 (West 2001) (defining marriage as "[a] civil contract by which one man and 
one woman take each other for husband and wife"). However, Vermont's new 
civil union law operates in the same way as its marriage law and legalizes the 
parental relationship between a lesbian coparent and her child: 
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lesbian coparent to adopt the biological child of her partner 
(same-sex second parent adoption), thus legalizing the 
parental status of the lesbian coparent, many states still do 
not, thus limiting the ability of a lesbian coparent to be 
considered the child's legal parent.14 In states that do not 
recognize second parent adoptions by a same-sex partner, a 
lesbian coparent generally has no mechanism by which she 
can establish her legal parenthood. 15 Moreover, even in 
states that do offer same-sex second parent adoptionI not all eligible parties avail themselves of the opportunity, 6 and a 
lesbian coparent may have no legal rights to continue her 
relationship with her child when the relationship termin-
ates. Thus, children like Micah are routinely separated 
from a lesbian co parent who has nurtured and loved them 
because she is not a legal parent and has little legal 
recourse to protect her parental relationship. As Micah's 
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom 
either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, 
shall be the same as those of a married couple, with respect to a child 
of whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during the 
marriage. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (Supp. 2000). 
14. Compare In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (holding 
that lesbian could adopt her life-partner's biological children), and In re 
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (same), with Angel Lace M. v. 
Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (denying lesbian's petition to adopt her 
life-partner's child). One author further notes: 
More than 20 states have formally recognized second-parent adoption 
and others have allowed such adoptions in individual cases, without 
ruling on the practice generally. Wisconsin, Ohio and Colorado have 
rejected second-parent adoptions. Furthermore, Florida, Mississippi 
and Utah do not allow same-sex couples to adopt children [and) 
Arkansas law prohibits gays from becoming foster parents. 
John Leland, State Laws Vary, But a Broad Trend Is Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2000, at F4. 
15. Although several states recognize a form of de facto or psychological 
parent to enable lesbian coparents to maintain contact with their children, 
these doctrines have been employed as a visitation tool and have not resulted in 
an adjudication of maternity. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) 
(finding that lesbian coparent was a psychological parent to twins and was 
properly awarded visitation with the children). 
16. For instance, in several of the cases discussed herein, the parties had 
discussed second-parent adoption but had not finalized the process-perhaps 
because, like many couples, they did not foresee the imminent termination of 
their relationship. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 544; E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 
711 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1999). Furthermore, many lesbian couples may be 
concerned about perceived homophobia or may be unfamiliar with the legal 
system and thus do not avail themselves of this option. 
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story illustrates, the consequences for a child who is 
separated from his lesbian co parent can be absolutely 
devastating. 
The failure to treat a lesbian coparent as a legal parent 
denies her the full spectrum of parental rights that she has 
voluntarily assumed, and simultaneously disadvantages 
her child. Legal parenthood confers many rights and 
responsibilities on a parent, and affords a child many 
benefits.17 Statutes in every state provide for the custody, 
support, and maintenance of children born to heterosexual 
parents, whether married or unmarried. IS Moreover, an 
adjudication of legal parentage under the UPA entitles a 
child to receive child support, 19 ~ualify as a dependent on 
her parent's health insurance, collect Social Security 
benefits from her parent,21 sustain an action for wrongful 
death,22 recover under a state worker's compensation law,23 
and in many states, to inherit from her parent.24 Persons 
17. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,118-19 (1989). 
18. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (amended 1973), 9A 
U.L.A. 573 (1998); id. §§ 402, 407, 9A U.L.A. 298, 398; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 
15-18 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 465-66, 486-87 (2001). 
19. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that children born out of 
wedlock are constitutionally entitled to the same right to support as afforded to 
children of married parents). 
20. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Funches, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49 
(Ct. App. 1999) (affirming trial court's decree in paternity suit mandating a 
monthly award of child support and health insurance coverage for his child); 
Martinez v. Agostini, 579 So.2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Pensa v. 
Sklinor, 547 So.2d 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (same); In re C.D.D., No. 04-98-
01023-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2522 (Ct. App. Apr. 19,2000) (affirming trial 
court's judgment declaring paternity and ordering father to pay support and 
health insurance for his child); In re Perez, No. 04-95-00724-CV, 1997 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 736 (Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1997) (same); De La Gorza v. Salazor, 851 S.W.2d 
380 (Tex. App. 1993) (same). 
21. See, e.g., Zahradnik v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding 
petitioner had established paternity for purposes of inheriting Social Security 
benefits under 42. U.S.C. § 416 (h)(2)(A»; Barton v. Sullivan, 774 F. Supp. 1151 
(S.D. Ind. 1991) (same); Donaldson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 567 F. 
Supp. 166 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Burrus v. Heckler, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16136 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1985) (finding child born out of wedlock eligible for 
Social Security benefits where no evidence negated presumption of paternity). 
22. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (ruling that Louisiana's Wrongful 
Death Act violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying recovery to a 
nonmarital child for the death ofthe mother). 
23. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
24. See, e.g., Brady v. Smith, No. E2000-01880-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 230 (Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2001) (finding children born out of-wedlock 
sufficiently established deceased father's paternity by DNA evidence and were 
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who are not deemed legal parents often cannot provide 
these important benefits for a child with whom they have a 
parent-like relationship.25 Lesbian coparents who are 
denied recognition of their parental status thus not only 
lose out on custodial benefits, their children are denied 
much of the financial security that other children with two 
parents receive as a matter of course. 26 
Legal parenthood also has many intangible benefits. 
Without an adjudication of parentage, lesbian coparents 
have no legal authority to make important medical or 
educational decisions for their children,27 or to influence 
religious or moral decisions.28 From a child's perspective, 
the absence of lesbian co parent maternity adjudication may 
deny her the love, nurture, and guidance of a person with 
whom she has developed a parental bond. Through custody 
and visitation statutes,29 legal parent status ensures for 
both parent and child the possibility of an ongoing 
emotional relationship. Unfortunately, lesbian coparents 
who seek to preserve their parental relationship with the 
child that they have helped raise, after the termination of 
their romantic relationship with the child's mother or after 
the biological lesbian mother dies, are often precluded from 
doing so because the law fails to recognize their parental 
status.30 
entitled to inheritance); Malone v. Thomas, 24 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App. 2000) 
(affirming trial court's determination that child established deceased father's 
paternity and was entitled to inheritance). 
25. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989) (declining to 
declare biological father as child's legal parent and denying father any parental 
rights with respect to the rearing of his biological child). 
26. See id. 
27. See id.; see also N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 359 (Colo. 2000) ("The 
determination of parenthood includes the right to parenting time; the right to 
direct the child's activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control, 
education, and health of the child; and the right to the child's services and 
earnings."). 
28. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118-19; NA.H., 9 P.3d at 359 ("Legal 
[parenthood) imposes significant obligations ... including ... the obligation to 
teach moral standards, religious beliefs, and good citizenship. "). 
29. Both paternity and divorce statutes contain custody and visitation 
provisions to ensure that, in the absence of egregious behavior on the part of 
one parent, both parents can continue to actively participate in the parenting 
process. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 15 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 465-66 (2001); UNIF. 
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 407 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 398 (1998). 
30. See, e.g., Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1999) (holding that 
lesbian coparent had no standing to proceed with visitation claim because 
psychological parent is not entitled to status equivalent to biological parent and 
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For lesbian coparents, attempts to gain legal 
recognition as parents are often unsuccessful.31 Federal and 
state law give significant deference to legal parents, thereby 
enabling a lesbian biological mother to bar her former 
partner and lesbian coparent from any involvement with 
the child.32 Many courts will not even entertain a lesbian 
coparent's petition for custody or visitation because a 
woman lacking a biological connection to her child is often 
deemed to lack standing to initiate court proceedings.33 As 
Professor Rubenstein observed, "this is true 
notwithstanding the fact that biology may mean less in a 
family in which the child is the product of some form of 
alternative insemination and in which the genetic 
connection may not correlate, even loosely, with the 
provision of day-to-day care for the growing child.,,34 
The problem of standing illustrates that the lesbian 
coparent cases exist against a backdrop of longstanding 
parental autonomy. Parents have long enjoyed considerable 
autonomy concerning how they raise their children35 and 
the Supreme Court has consistently held that parental 
rights should not be lightly intruded upon by third parties.36 
thus cannot overcome constitutional right to privacy hurdle); Alison D. v. 
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that lesbian coparent was not a 
legal parent under state statute and that third party equitable doctrine could 
not apply to lesbian coparent such that she would be enabled to interfere with 
biological mother's constitutional right to custody and control of her child). 
31. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991); 
Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27. 
32. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr at 216-17; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29. It 
has not escaped notice that it is reprehensible that lesbian biological parents 
use anti-gay sentiment and law to prevent their ex-partners from continued 
contact with their children. See Polikoff, supra note 7, at 542. 
33. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Propagate: An Introduction to 
Protecting Families: Standards for Child-Custody in Same-Sex Relationships, 
10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 146 (1999). 
34.Id. 
35. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weiss, Nonparent Visitation Rights v. Family 
Autonomy: An Abridgement of Parents' Constitutional Rights?, 10 SETON HALL 
CaNST. L.J. 1085 (2000). 
36. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (finding 
unconstitutionally broad a Washington state statute which permitted any 
person to petition the court for visitation rights at any time and further allowed 
the court to order visitation rights for any such person when visitation served 
the best interests of the child, but did not adequately require that petitioners 
demonstrate a substantial relationship with the child nor that courts consider 
the parents' reason(s) for limiting visitation); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong 
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Third party visitation doctrine is predicated on the notion 
that a child has one mother and one father and that any 
other person occupies the less privileged legal position of 
third party. Thus, third parties-including, among others, 
grandparents, stepparents, foster parents, and other 
relatives-are restricted in their ability to interact with a 
child against the legal parent's wishes, because to permit 
third parties unrestricted access to a child would violate the 
parent's constitutional rights of parental autonomy and 
• 37 pnvacy. 
In their attempts to seek legal recognition of their 
parenthood and to maintain contact with their children, 
lesbian coparents have been treated as third parties.3s Like 
other third parties, when a lesbian co parent seeks ongoing 
custody and visitation with the biological child of her same-
sex partner, she is often unsuccessful in overcoming the 
constitutional principles of parental autonomy and 
privacy.39 Traditionally, a third party could only assert a 
claim for custody of a nonbiological child if she could 
establish that the biological parent was unfit.40 In lesbian 
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. 
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now 
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty interest 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to "establish a 
home and bring up children" without state interference). 
37. See Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody 
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1385 (1994). 
38. Courts have increasingly used third party visitation doctrines such as 
psychological and de facto parent to preserve visitation between a lesbian 
coparent and her child, but not as a way to adjudicate the lesbian coparent's 
maternity. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (finding that 
lesbian coparent was a psychological parent to twins and was properly awarded 
visitation with the children); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) 
(holding that lesbian coparent was a de facto parent and probate court properly 
entered order permitting visitation between lesbian coparent and child). 
39. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. 2000). In upholding 
a biological mother's right to maintain full custody and control of her children 
in accordance with constitutional principles, the court stated: 
While Tennessee's legislature has generally conferred upon parents the 
right of custody and control of their children, it has not conferred upon 
[a lesbian coparent] any right of visitation. Absent any statutory 
authority establishing such a third-party'.s right to visitation, parents 
retain the right to determine with whom their children associate. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
40. An allegation of parental unfitness may overcome the general 
presumption that a parent has a fundamental right to the care and custody of 
her child. See, e.g., V.C., 748 A.2d at 548-49 ("[I]f there is a showing of 
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coparent cases, however, the biological parent is ordinarily 
not unfit, thereby rendering the lesbian coparent 
petitioner's claim for custody meritless.41 
Unfortunately, by categorizing lesbian coparents as 
mere third party petitioners or "legal strangers," courts 
overlook the actual parental relationship that has been 
established. Lesbian coparents are anything but third 
parties-they are involved, nurturing, loving, and 
supportive parents. Lesbian coparents are different from 
traditional third parties because they intend and plan, with 
their partner's agreement and encouragement, to be a 
parent. Lesbian coparents thus actively participate in the 
decision to create a family and, indeed, function as parents. 
But, because under existing law and court practice lesbian 
coparents are not protected by state divorce or parentage 
statutes, they are denied legal recognition of their actual 
parental role.42 
Through categorization alone, many courts have 
deemed lesbian coparents something "other than" or "less 
than" parents and approach the issue of lesbian coparenting 
from a third-party perspective rather than a second-parent 
perspective.43 In typical paternity disputes,44 courts do not 
treat the putative father45 as a mere third party-rather, 
they treat the putative father as the child's other parent, 
unfitness, abandonment or gross misconduct, a parent's right to custody of her 
child may be usurped."); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 ("[S]o long as a 
parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally 
be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to 
further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning 
the rearing of that parent's children."). 
41. See, e.g., Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. 1998) (requiring 
unfitness, abandonment, or extraordinary circumstances before terminating 
parental rights). 
42. Tsippi Wray, Lesbian Relationships and Parenthood: Models for Legal 
Recognition of Nontraditional Families, 21 RAMLINE L. REV. 127, 131-32 (1997). 
43. See generally Robson, supra note 37. 
44. By typical paternity dispute, I refer to the situation in which only two 
parents, one mother and one father, are parties to the action. This is in contrast 
to a situation in which three potential parents, one mother and two fathers, are 
involved. For a discussion of this "atypical" paternity dispute, see infra Part 
lILA. 
45. "Putative father" is defined as "the alleged or reputed father of a child 
born out of wedlock." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990). As discussed 
below, a putative father may have no biological connection whatsoever to the 
child for whom he may be adjudicated the legal parent. See infra Part lILA. 
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within a parental analytic framework. 46 For example, in 
adjudicating paternity disputes, courts do not resolve by 
piecemeal decision-making a part of the parental dispute-
such as visitation-but resolve the entire bundle of parental 
rights, including custody, visitation, child support, health 
insurance, and parentage adjudication. The paradigm of 
traditional third party doctrine disadvantages a lesbian 
coparent: it categorizes her as a "legal stranger" and 
thereby distances her from the parental framework. 
Rather than applying third party visitation doctrine as 
a piecemeal remedy for lesbian coparents, courts should 
instead use a parental analytic framework-specifically, the 
Uniform Parentage Act-to adjudicate maternity for lesbian 
coparents. Just as nonbiological fathers can, and do, obtain 
parentage adjudications under the UPA,47 lesbian coparents 
should also be able to obtain legal declarations of 
parentage. The text of the Act lends itself to such an 
application, as the UPA includes a provision for a 
declaration of maternity.48 
U sing the UP A would enable courts to legalize the 
relationship between children and their lesbian coparents 
by properly placing lesbian coparents within the parental 
framework and thus allowing them (and their children) to 
realize all of the benefits discussed above. In fact, the UPA's 
46. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 302 (2001). A putative father 
has a clear basis for standing upon which to bring his claim; courts require him 
to prove his parenthood, but do not require him to master the standing or 
jurisdictional gymnastics that lesbian coparents, as third party legal strangers, 
are required to perform. Id. 
47. See discussion infra Part lILA. 
48. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 334 (2001); see infra notes 
165-67 and accompanying text. Fourteen states have adopted the UPA 1973 
provision that would allow for adjudication of maternity. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-
17-4, 26-17-18 (1992); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 19-4-104 (West 1999); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to 584-21 (1993); 750 
ILL. COMPo STAT. 45/4, 45/19 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.819, 210.848 
(West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-104, 40-6-121 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 126.041, 126.071 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-
4, 40-11-21 (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-03, 14-17-20 (1997); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.02, 3111.17 (Anderson 2000); R.L GEN. LAws § 15-8-26 
(2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.030, 26.26.170 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 14-2-101, 14-2-118 (Michie 2001). Additionally, three non-UPA states 
have similar provisions that would allow for a<ljudication of maternity. See 
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-803 (West 2000); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209C, § 
21 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-45 (West 1993). UPA 2000 similarly 
contains a provision permitting maternity adjudication. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 
106 (2000). 
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maternity provision has been used by at least one state's 
supreme court as the procedural basis upon which to hear a 
lesbian coparent dispute ,49 and lower courts in several 
states have used the UPA's maternity J?rovision to 
adjudicate maternity for a lesbian coparent. While only 
eighteen states have adopted the UPA's maternity 
provision, all states should consider adopting the provision: 
Maternity adjudication under the UPA offers the most 
consistent method of legitimizing the lesbian coparentlchild 
relationship and best protects a lesbian coparent and her 
child.51 
Moreover, when the UPA was promulgated more than 
thirty years ago, the drafters sought to protect equally the 
rights of children born to unmarried heterosexual parents 
and those of children born to married heterosexual 
parents. 52 The legislation was prompted by concerns for the 
unjust financial and emotional ramifications associated 
with having only one legal parent.53 Yet the concerns today 
for children born to unmarried lesbian parents are the same 
as those for children born of unmarried heterosexual 
parents thirty years ago: children need the financial and 
emotional seGurity that comes with having two parents. 
And parents need the security that comes with having the 
enforceable legal rights of parenthood. 
Using the UPA to adjudicate maternity would resolve 
much of the murkiness that now exists in lesbian coparent 
disputes. Courts would be able to use the UP A to confer all 
of the rights and responsibilities of parenthood upon lesbian 
coparents-as is typical in paternity cases-both after the 
dissolution of a lesbian relationship and prior to such 
49. See Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.!. 2000). 
50. See Shannon Minter & Kate Kendell, Beyond Second-Parent Adoption: 
The Uniform Parentage Act and the "Intended Parents"-A Model Brief, 2 GEO. 
J. GENDER & L. 29, 32-33 (2000). The authors note that California and Colorado 
trial courts and a Massachusetts probate court have all granted parentage 
decrees to lesbian coparents under the UPA. Id. at 33 nn.27-28 (citing In re 
Twin A & Twin B, No. 99 JV (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1999) and M.K. & C.P. v. Med. Ctr., 
Inc., No. OOW 1343 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. 2000». 
51. Using the UPA to adjudicate maternity is suggested as a preferred 
alternative to same-sex second parent adoption, which accomplishes the same 
goal, because UPA maternity adjudication is faster and less expensive than an 
adoption and begins from the premise that the nonbiological mother is, in fact, 
the child's parent. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
52. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 289 (2001). 
53. Id. at 288. 
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dissolution.54 Additionally, the UPA provides a clear, 
consistent basis of standing to lesbian coparents for parent 
custody and visitation disputes. Third party equitable 
doctrines such as de facto parenthood and psychological 
parenthood can be employed within the parental framework 
of the UPA to adjudicate maternity.55 
Moreover, using the UPA, courts would be able to 
appropriately apply a parental analytic framework in 
lesbian coparent disputes, akin to that employed in 
heterosexual paternity disputes and heterosexual divorces.56 
Adjudication under the UP A is advantageous for lesbian 
coparents because establishing maternity under the UPA 
can be done more quickly and cheaply than with second-
parent adoption. 57 Furthermore, a complaint under the UPA 
need not initiate an adversarial proceeding; for instance, 
parties can file a written voluntary acknowledgment of 
parentage with the court, in lieu of filing a complaint, which 
would have the same force and effect as an adjudication of 
maternity. 58 Filing of a maternity petition, before or after 
the child's birth, can immediately legalize the relationship 
between the child and her lesbian coparent and provide 
absolute protection of the relationship in the event of the 
54. While paternity statutes may be implemented in adversarial situations, 
the UPA clearly anticipates voluntary paternity adjudications in some cases. 
VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4, 6 (1973), 9B V.L.A. 298-99, 302-03 (2001). 
55. See discussion infra Part lIl.A. Paternity adjudication does not merely 
legitimize the child, it legitimizes the father of the child, by recognizing his 
legal entitlement to a parental relationship. See Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 
U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989). Similarly, maternity adjudication would provide 
necessary legal recognition and protection for millions of lesbian families. 
56. See VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 15 (1973), 9B V.L.A. 324-25 (2001); VNIF. 
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 407 (amended 1973), 9A V.L.A. 398 (1998). 
57. Emily Doskow, The Second-Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex 
Couples in a Brave New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 21 (1999). 
An adoption [in California] takes six to eight months to complete, and 
cannot be commenced until after the child's birth. The DSS 
[Department of Social Services] charges a fee of $1,250 for its 
investigation. In contrast, the VPA petition can be filed prior to the 
child's birth if desired, and because there is no DSS investigation, there 
is no $1,250 fee. 
[d. at 21 n.118 (citation omitted). 
58. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209C, § l1(a) (West 1998). In 
addition to the acknowledgment of parentage, the parties can also file a 
parenting agreement, which reflects their intentions concerning support, 
custody, visitation, and the like. [d. For purposes of establishing maternity, a 
coparenting agreement further exemplifies to the court the parties' joint 
intention to create a "two mommies" family. 
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dissolution of the lesbian relationship or the biological 
mother's death. Thus, the UP A offers the most reliable 
method for legalizing a full parental relationship for lesbian 
coparents with their children. 
II. How COURTS APPLY THIRD PARTY EQUITABLE DOCTRINE 
TO LESBIAN COPARENT DISPUTES: THREE CASE STUDIES 
When lesbian couples who have children dissolve their 
romantic relationships, they do not have the luxury of 
turning to a marital dissolution statute for guidance 
concerning the continued care, maintenance, and education 
of their children.59 Lesbian coparents, without any biological 
tie to a child with whom they have developed a parental 
relationship, are often without legal recourse to preserve 
their parenthood.60 In the last decade, however, several 
state courts have permitted lesbian coparents ongoing 
visitation with their nonbiological children.61 Balancing the 
importance of a biological parent's constitutional rights in 
raising her child against the "right" of a lesbian coparent to 
maintain an ongoing parental relationship with a child, 
several courts have sought to define parameters under 
which a parent-like relationship can be established without 
infringing on the biological parent's rights.62 
These cases have relied upon general third party 
equitable principles to provide standing for the petitioning 
lesbian coparent.63 Unfortunately, although these courts 
59. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 
573 (1998) (setting forth guidelines for calculating child support in a proceeding 
for dissolution of marriage). 
60. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
61. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995); E.N.O. v. 
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 
(N.J. 2000). 
62. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 436 (invocation of general equitable principles 
to preserve the rights of a lesbian coparent must be exercised in a manner that 
protects a biological parent's autonomy and constitutional rights); E.N.O., 711 
N.E.2d at 893 (finding that the rights of parents to the care and custody of their 
children is not absolute and that the biological mother's interest in protecting 
her custody of her child must be balanced against the child's interest in 
maintaining the relationship with her de facto parent); V.C., 748 A.2d at 548-9 
(finding that the rights of parents to the care and custody of their children is 
not absolute, thereby opening the door to the psychological parent doctrine). 
63. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421 (finding that existing visitation statutes 
did not preempt the "courts' long recognized equitable power to protect the best 
interest of a child by ordering visitation under circumstances not included in 
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recognized the importance to the children of an ongoing 
parent-child relationship, the courts' decisions still did not 
sufficiently resolve the conflicts, because no adjudication of 
legal parentage was conferred upon the petitioner lesbian 
coparents. Without recognizing legal parenthood, courts 
only "fix" a part of the problem (visitation) and ignore the 
many other emotional and financial benefits of legal 
parenthood that children of lesbian coparents are denied. 
While courts recognizing the rights of lesbian coparents 
have made tremendous strides in preserving the interests 
of the nontraditional family, these courts have not done 
enough to fully protect the interests of the children and 
their nonbiological parents. Equitable principles alone are 
not sufficient to adequately address the lesbian coparent 
dilemma. 
The highest courts in three states that, in seminal 
lesbian co parent dispute cases, have permitted ongoing 
access by a lesbian co parent to her nonbiological child, have 
employed various third party equitable doctrines in 
rendering their decisions. Whether the court deemed the 
lesbian coparent to be in a parent-like relationship, a 
psychological parent, or a de facto parent, these quasi-
parental designations allowed the petitioners to participate 
in a best interests custody/visitation analysis. Notwith-
standing the positive effect of applying these quasi-parental 
doctrines to the petitioners, the result of these decisions is 
that the lesbian coparent clearly occupies a much inferior 
status to that of the biological parent, because quasi-
parental doctrines do not confer a status comparable to 
legal parenthood.64 Despite facts in all three cases that 
clearly suggest a two parent family (comprised of "two 
mommies")-which would otherwise dictate that the courts 
should analyze the cases using a parental analytic 
framework, as in paternity or divorce-the courts relied on 
the statute"); E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 890 ("The court's duty as parens patriae 
necessitates that its equitable powers extend to protecting the best interests of 
children in actions before the court, even if the Legislature has not determined 
what the best interests require in a particular situation."); V.C., 748 A.2d at 548 
(invoking the court's equitable power to broadly interpret New Jersey's 
definition of "parent" to include a person who is not related to the child by blood 
or adoption but has stood in a parental role with the child, thereby permitting a 
best interests analysis). 
64. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
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an expansion of third party doctrine to preserve the lesbian 
coparent's relationship with her child(ren). 
A. Parent-like Relationship 
In Holtzman v. Knott, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
held that a lesbian co parent should be permitted to 
maintain an ongoing relationship with the biological child 
of her same-sex partner if certain criteria are met.65 
Holtzman and Knott were in a long-term committed 
relationship when they decided to have a child.66 The couple 
agreed that Knott would conceive by artificial insemination, 
and their child was born on December 15, 1988.67 Within 
their circle of family and friends, both women were clearly 
considered the baby's parents: the baby's name was 
fashioned using first and middle names from each of their 
families and the surname was a combination of both of their 
last names; both women were named the child's parents at 
their child's dedication ceremony at their church; and 
Holtzman's parents were recognized by the couple as the 
baby's grandparents and her sister as the baby's 
godmother.68 For the next five years, the couple shared 
child-care responsibilities, while Holtzman provided 
primary financial support for the family.69 The relationship 
soured in 1993, with Knott ultimately bringing an action to 
prevent Holtzman from having any contact with her or with 
their child.70 Holtzman then filed a petition for custody and 
a petition for visitation.71 The circuit court denied 
Holtzman's petitions, finding that Wisconsin law did not 
recognize "the alternate type of relationship which existed 
in this case" and further, that there was no basis for relief. 72 
65. 533 N.W.2d at 421 (articulating a four-prong test to demonstrate the 
existence of a parent-child relationship as a means of establishing standing and 
triggering a best interests analysis for ongoing visitation); see infra text 
accompanying note 78. Holtzman is often cited as In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. 
66.Id. 
67.Id. 
68. Id. at 422. 
69.Id. 
70.Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 423. However, the court also stated: 
There are an increasing number of children in this society for whom 
the mother is the only known biological parent. Frequently that mother 
forms a lengthy relationship living with another person, be they man 
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On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the 
lower court's determination that Holtzman did not have a 
viable custody claim,73 but ruled that she could proceed with 
her claim for visitation. Holtzman asserted that Wisconsin's 
visitation statute provided jurisdiction for her visitation 
claim.74 The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed and 
determined that the statute only applied to those visitation 
claims by third parties arising in connection with a 
divorce.75 However, the court concluded that the legislature 
did not intend the statute to "occupy the field of visitation," 
nor "intend [its] visitation statute to supplant or preempt 
the courts' long-standing equitable power to protect the best 
interest of a child by orderinp visitation in circumstances 
not included in the statute."7 Rather, the court concluded 
Id. 
or woman, who assumes a parental role in the child's life for many 
years. Why should such children be denied the love, guidance and 
nurturing of the parental bond which developed simply because adults 
cannot maintain their relationship? Lack of love and guidance in the 
lives of children is a major problem in our society. Does it make sense 
for the law to worsen this sad fact by denying a child contact with one 
they have come to accept as their parent, especially when it clearly 
appears to be in the best interest of the child? 
73. Holtzman's custody claim failed for the reasons discussed above; because 
of the constitutional principles of parental autonomy and privacy, a third party 
is unable to prevail on a claim for custody in the absence of parental unfitness. 
Id. at 436; see also supra text accompanying notes 36-41. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that "[a] person who is not a biological or adoptive parent 
may not bring an action to obtain custody of a minor unless the biological or 
adoptive parent is 'unfit or unable to care for the child' or there are compelling 
reasons for awarding custody to a nonparent." Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 423 
(citations omitted). 
74. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 424. Wisconsin's visitation statute provides: 
[U)pon petition by a grandparent, great grandparent, stepparent or 
person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child 
relationship with the child, the court may grant reasonable visitation 
rights to that person if the parents have notice of the hearing and if the 
court determines that visitation is in the best interests of the child. 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 2001) (emphasis added). 
75. The court engaged in an extensive review of the statute's legislative 
history and concluded that "the legislature appears to have intended that 
visitation petitions brought under sec. 767.245 be considered within the context 
ofa dissolving marriage." Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 426. 
76. Id. at 425. Reviewing Wisconsin's visitation statutes, the court noted: 
[T)he legislature has clearly and repeatedly expressed the policy that 
courts are to act in the best interest of children. It is reasonable to infer 
that the legislature did not intend the visitation statutes to bar the 
courts from exercising their equitable power to order visitation in 
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that a trial court has equitable power to hear a petition for 
visitation when it determines that the petitioner has a 
parent-like relationship with the child and that a 
significant triggering event justifies state intervention in 
the child's relationship with her biological or adoptive 
parent. 77 
The court articulated a four-prong test that a petitioner 
must satisfy to prove a parent-child relationship: 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and 
fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-
like relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the 
child lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner 
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant 
responsibility for the child's care, education, and development, 
including contributing towards the child's support, without 
expectation of financial compensation [though such contribution 
need not be monetary]; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a 
parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established 
with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in 
78 
nature. 
The court determined that such a test balances the 
biological or adoptive parent's autonomy and constitutional 
rights while preserving the child's relationship with an 
adult who has functioned as a parent.79 The four-pronged 
parent-like relationship test is useful to permit continued 
visitation, but the test does not establish "legal 
parenthood." Rather, the test establishes a quasi-
parenthood that is considered only with respect to visitation 
issues and does not establish parental ~arity between the 
lesbian coparent and her former partner. 0 
circumstances not included within the statutes but in conformity with 
the policy directions set forth in the statutes. 
[d. at 431. 
77. [d. at 435. 
78. [d. at 435-36 (footnote omitted). 
79. [d. at 436. 
80. The focus and purpose of the court's discussion of the four-part "parent-
like relationship test" was to determine on what basis Holtzman could assert a 
claim for visitation, not custody. [d. at 437 ("A circuit court may determine 
whether visitation with Holtzman is in the child's best interest if Holtzman first 
proves under the four part test that she has a parent-like relationship with the 
child .... "). 
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B. Psychological Parent 
Although under the guise of a different name, the 
psychological parent doctrine is nearly identical to the 
parent-like relationship doctrine.81 In V.C. v. M.J.B., the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that a nonbiological 
lesbian coparent had functioned as a psychological parent 
to her former partner's biological children and awarded her 
visitation rights.82 V.C. and M.J.B. began dating on July 4, 
1993 and five days later M.J.B. visited a fertility specialist 
to begin artificial insemination procedures.83 Early in their 
relationship, the women discussed having children, and as 
M.J.B. continued the artificial insemination process, V.C. 
attended at least two sessions.84 The relationship 
progressed: V.C. moved in with M.J.B. in December 1993 
and, in February 1994, when M.J.B. learned that she was 
pregnant, she called V.C. at work "to tell her the good 
news.,,85 Eventually the couple learned that M.J.B. was 
carrying twins and the two women prepared for the birth of 
the twins by attending pre-natal and Lamaze classes.86 
The facts suggested that the women jointly planned to 
parent: both attended pre-natal and Lamaze classes; they 
jointly decided on the children's names; they decided that 
V.C. would be called "Meema" and M.J.B. would be called 
"Mommy"; V.C. was present in the delivery room for the 
birth of the twins; the couple opened joint bank accounts for 
household expenses; they prepared wills and powers of 
attorney, naming each other as beneficiary on their 
respective life insurance policies, and opened savings 
accounts for the children with M.J.B. as custodian of one 
account and V.C. as custodian of the other; and, most 
significantly, the couple held themselves out both privately 
and publicly as a family.87 In February 1995, the couple 
purchased a home together, and in July 1995 they had a 
commitment ceremony, thereafter considering themselves 
"married. ,,88 
81. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). 
82. [d. at 555. 
83. [d. at 542. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. 
87. [d. at 542-43. 
88. [d. at 543. 
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In June 1996, the couple consulted with an attorney 
concerning V.C.'s adopting the twins, but the adoption was 
never finalized. 89 In August 1996, M.J.B. ended the 
relationship and the women then took turns living in the 
house with the children until November 1996.90 In 
December 1996, V.C. moved out but continued contributing 
to household expenses and she visited with the children 
approximately every other weekend.91 By the summer of 
1997, however, the couple's relationship had truly 
deteriorated and M.J.B. no longer permitted V.C. to visit 
with the children or accepted V.C.'s financial 
contributions.92 V.C. subsequently filed a petition for joint 
legal custody of the twins.93 The trial court determined that 
V.C. did not have standing to petition for joint legal custody 
because she did not allege that M.J.B. was an unfit parent; 
V.C. appealed.94 
On appeal, M.J.B. asserted that V.C. had no standing to 
bring her claims because she did not allege that M.J.B. was 
an unfit parent and, further, that V.C.'s petition was an 
intrusion on her basic liberty interest and parental 
autonomy in raising her children.95 V.C. contended that she 
qualified as a parent under New Jersey statutory law and 
that she was a psychological parent, justifying the 
invocation of the state's parens patriae power.96 
V.C. sought ongoing contact with her children under a 
state statute which allows the court to enter visitation and 
custody orders upon the separation of a child's parents.97 
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the 
definition of "parent" within the family law statutory 
scheme encompasses more than a biological or adoptive 
parent.98 The court noted that the visitation statute 
89. [d. at 544. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 545. 
95. [d. at 546. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 547. The statute provides that "[w]hen the parents of a minor 
child live separately, or are about to do so, the Superior Court, in an action 
brought by either parent, shall have the same power to make judgments or 
orders concerning care, custody, education and maintenance as concerning a 
minor child whose parents are divorced." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-3 (West 1993). 
98. 748 A.2d at 547. 
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provides that "the word 'parent,' when not otherwise 
described by the context~ means a natural parent or parent 
by previous adoption.,,9 Thus, the court determined, the 
legislature must have envisioned circumstances in which a 
relationship between a child and a person not specifically 
denominated by the statute as a parent would, in fact, 
qualify as "parental."lOO The court concluded that it could 
exercise jurisdiction over V.C.'s complaint since a broad 
reading of the statute includes parents other than biological 
d t · t 101 or a op lve paren s. 
The court did not end its inquiry there, however. 
Instead, it turned its analysis to whether V.C. had standing 
apart from the statute to bring her complaint since she did 
not allege that M.J.B. was an unfit parent. l02 The court 
reverted to a traditional inquiry and application of third 
party visitation doctrine determining whether a non-parent 
can seek visitation with a child in the absence of the legal 
parent's unfitness. In determining that third party 
visitation doctrine could be applied in this case, the court 
effectively distanced itself from the parental analytic 
framework it had considered. 
Holding that under general equitable third party 
visitation doctrine V.C. could maintain her visitation 
request, the court concluded that, while an allegation of 
unfitness or abandonment is generally the prerequisite for 
a third party to seek custody and visitation of another 
person's child, there is an "exceptional circumstances" 
category that provides an alternative basis for proceeding 
with a custody and/or visitation complaint. l03 Subsumed 
99. Id. (emphasis added). 
100. Id. at 548. The court did not engage in a long elaboration of its 
statutory interpretation, but noted that: 
Id. 
Although the Legislature may not have considered the precise case 
before us, it is hard to imagine what it could have had in mind in 
adding the "context" language other than a situation such as this, in 
which a person not related to a child by blood or adoption has stood in a 
parental role vis-a-vis the child. 
101. Id. The court did not elaborate and discuss whether V.C. had exercised 
a "parental" relationship with the twins; the court engaged in that analysis as 
part of its discussion of standing and psychological parenthood. Id. at 548-50. 
102. Id. at 548. 
103. Id. at 549. "[Exceptional circumstances) has been recognized as an 
alternative basis for a third party to seek custody and visitation of another 
person's child. The 'exceptional circumstances' category contemplates the 
intervention of the Court in the exercise of its parens patriae power to protect a 
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within the exceptional circumstances category, the court 
noted, are the psychological parent cases in which a third 
party has assumed the role of a legal parent "who has been 
unable or unwilling to undertake the obligation of 
parenthood."104 At the heart of the doctrine is "a recognition 
that children have a strong interest in maintaining the ties 
that connect them to adults who love and provide for 
them.,,105 Even though V.C. did not step into M.J.B.'s role as 
a parent, but instead worked alongside her in establishing a 
family, the court held that V.C. had standing to maintain 
her action under the exceptional circumstances/psych-
010gical parent doctrine. lOS To determine whether a 
petitioner has established herself as a psychological parent, 
the court adopted the four-prong test outlined in Holtzman 
v. Knott. 107 Under the psychological parent test, the court 
concluded that V.C. should have continued visitation with 
the children on a regular basis. However, due to the long 
pendency of the case, the court concluded it would be 
unnecessarily disruptive to then inject V.C. into the 
"decisional realm" and denied her an award of joint legal 
custody. 108 
Using psychological parenthood, the court accomplished 
the important goal of assuring ongoing parental contact 
between V.C. and her children, but did not recognize her as 
a parent in any other way. Third party visitation doctrine 
effectively distanced V.C. from the parental analytic 
framework, despite the court's earlier determination that 
V.C. qualified as a parent under New Jersey's visitation 
statute.109 Furthermore, third party visitation doctrine, by 
its very nature, does not provide the lesbian coparent with 
child." Id. (citations omitted). The court determined that the exceptional 
circumstances category includes psychological parents. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 550. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 551. ("The most thoughtful and inclusive definition of de facto 
parenthood is the test enunciated in [Holtzman v. Knott) and adopted ... here. 
It addresses the main fears and concerns both legislatures and courts have 
advanced when addressing the notion of psychological parenthood. "). 
108. Id. at 555. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100. Even if the court had found 
that V.C. was a "parent" under the New Jersey visitation statute, the c~urt did 
not entertain the possibility of a parentage adjudication, nor would such 
adjudication be possible pursuant to a visitation statute alone. 
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rights equivalent to those of a legal parent. 110 Although 
psychological parenthood allowed V.C. continued access to 
her children, the result in the case shows that her rights 
are clearly inferior to those of her former partner. AB the 
court stated: 
The legal parent's status is a significant weight in the best 
interests balance because eventually, in the search for self-
knowledge, the child's interest in his or her roots will emerge. 
Thus, under ordinary circumstances when the evidence concerning 
the child's best interests (as between a legal parent and 
psychological parent) is in equipoise, custody will be awarded to 111 the legal parent. 
C. De Facto Parent 
Using a slightly different test, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, in E.N.D. v. L.M.M., invoked 
general equitable principles to award a lesbian coparent 
petitioner visitation with the biological child of her same-
sex partner.112 In 1991, the two women-who at the time 
lived in Maryland-shared a committed, monogamous 
relationship, and decided to have a baby by artificial 
insemination.113 The couple attended parenting workshops 
and sessions on artificial insemination; E.N.O. was present 
at the actual insemination sessions, and both women 
participated in all medical decisions.114 In 1994, the 
insemination process was successful and L.M.M. became 
pregnant. E.N.O., present at the birth and acting as birth 
coach, cut the umbilical cord, and was treated by hospital 
staff "as a mother.,,115 The couple sent out birth 
110. As Professor Ruthann Robson notes in a her criticism of V.C. v. M.J.B., 
the court creates an inequality relating to proof of parenthood, which also 
persists in the way the standard is implemented. Moreover, the legal parent 
enjoys preferential treatment by virtue of her biological connection to the child. 
Thus, the "parity" of which the court writes is illusory because the rights of the 
lesbian coparent are subordinate to those of the legal parent. Ruthann Robson, 
Making Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory & The Judicial Construction of Lesbian 
Mothers, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 15,33-34 (2000). 
111. 748 A.2d at 554. 
112. 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999). 
113. Id. at 888. 
114. [d. 
115. Id. at 889. 
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announcements naming them both as the child's parents.U6 
Before the child was born and again after the child's birth, 
the parties executed a coparenting agreement in which they 
expressly stated that they intended to coparent the child 
and that E.N.O. would retain her parental status, even if 
the couple were to separate.1l7 Following the child's birth, 
E.N.O. assumed most of the financial responsibility for the 
family and, for a period of seven months, she assumed 
primary care for the child when L.L.M. was experiencing 
medical problems. us 
In September 1997, the couple moved to Massachusetts; 
and in the spring of 1998, E.N.O. consulted an attorney 
regarding a second-parent adoption. u9 Shortly thereafter, 
the parties' relationship began to deteriorate. 12o In June 
1998, E.N.O. filed a complaint seeking specific performance 
of the parties' agreement to allow her to adopt the child, 
and for joint custody and visitation, as well as a settlement 
of the parties' financial affairs.121 A probate court judge 
ordered temporary visitation, applying the "best interests of 
the child" standard and noting that, pursuant to 
Massachusetts's paternity statute, " 'children born to 
parents who are not married to each other should be 
treated in the same manner as all other children.' ,,122 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court disagreed 
that statutes governing paternity were applicable to this 
case.123 However, the court determined that the probate 
116. [d. 
117. [d. Massachusetts might enforce such a coparenting agreement if its 
terms reflect the best interests of the child. The E.N.O. court noted that a 
cohabiting couple can contract concerning the rights of their children as long as 
the court determines that the terms reflect the child's best interests. [d. at 892 
(citing Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 148 n.7 (Mass. 1998)); see also AC. v. 
C.B., 829 P.2d 660,664 (N.M. 1992) (an agreement between a biological mother 
and lesbian coparent concerning coparenting issues upon the dissolution of the 
relationship was deemed enforceable by the New Mexico appeals court, so long 
as the terms represented the best interests ofthe child). 
118. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889. 
119. [d. Second-parent adoption was not available in Maryland. 
120. [d. 
121. See id. 
122. [d. (quoting the trial court). The court cited to a Massachussetts child 
support statute which provides that "[clhildren born to parents who are not 
married to each other shall be entitled to the same rights and protections of the 
law as all other children." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 1 (West 1998). 
123. 711 N.E.2d at 890 n.3. Interestingly, Massachusetts's parentage 
statute specifically includes a maternity provision modeled after that included 
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court's equitable powers extend to protecting the best 
interests of children, even if the legislature has not 
articulated what "best interests" require in a particular 
situation. 124 Finding that the best interest standard is 
amorphous, the court stated that "the 'best interests 
calculus' must include an examination of the child's 
relationship with both [her] legal and de facto parent."125 
Reviewing the facts in the case before it, the court 
concluded that E.N.O. met the definition of a de facto 
parent and was properly awarded visitation.126 The court 
defined a de facto parent as a person who: 
has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in the 
child's life as a member of the child's family. The de facto parent 
resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of 
the legal parent, performs a share of care taking functions at least 
as great as the legal parent. The de facto parent shapes the child's 
daily routine, addresses his developmental needs, disciplines the 
child, provides for his education and medical care, and serves as a 
I 'd 127 mora gUl e. 
in the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act. The statute provides, in part, that "[alny 
interested party may bring an action to determine the existence of a mother and 
child relationship." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209C, § 21. Furthermore, as the 
trial judge determined, the purpose of the Massachusetts parentage statute is 
to ensure that children born out of wedlock are treated in the same manner as 
children born to married parents. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889; see supra note 122 
and accompanying text. The E.N.O. court relegated its dismissal of the 
applicability of the paternity statute to a footnote, although it certainly would 
make sense under the Massachusetts parentage statute to allow E.N.O. 
standing to pursue her claim under that provision. The de facto parent analysis 
should be the second step in determining the visitation and parental rights of 
the lesbian coparent, after first exercising jurisdiction over the dispute under 
the parentage statute. See discussion infra Part III. 
124. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 890. The court cited a Massachussetts statute 
that provides: "The probate and family court department shall have original 
and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme judicial court and the superior 
court department of all cases and matters of equity cognizable under the 
general principles of equity jurisprudence and, with reference thereto, shall be 
courts of general equity jurisdiction .... " MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 215, § 6 
(West 1989). 
125. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891. 
126. [d. at 892. The court emphasized that the biological parent endorsed 
and consented to the lesbian coparent's full parental role in raising their child, 
as evidenced both through the parties' actions and their written coparenting 
agreement. [d. 
127. [d. at 891 (citing Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999) and 
ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §§ 2.03(1)(b), (6) (Tent. 
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded 
that E.N.O.'s visitation request, based upon her status as a 
de facto parent, did not inappropriately infringe on the 
rights of L.M.M. because the child's interest in maintaining 
a relationship with E.N.O. outweighed L.M.M.'s custodial 
interest. 128 
AI3 this was an appeal from a temporary order 
concerning visitation, the court did not address other 
"parental" concerns, such as child support, health 
insurance, life insurance, and most importantly, an 
adjudication of parentage. However, since the court 
specifically concluded that Massachusetts's parentage 
statute did not apply, the court foreclosed the possibility of 
a maternity adjudication and with it, foreclosed the child's 
ability to benefit from two legal parents. Furthermore, 
while the court emphasized that E.N.O.'s visitation claim 
did not infringe on L.M.M.'s custodial interest, the court 
might have viewed a custodial award to E.N.O. differently if 
it had followed the reasoning of V.C. u. M.J.B. and 
determined that a de facto parent's rights are subordinate 
to those of a biological parent.129 
D. Why Equitable Doctrines Are Only a Partial Solution 
By approaching the lesbian coparent cases from a 
parent-like, psychological parent, de facto parent, or similar 
perspective, courts have made considerable progress, and 
have improved the chances for a lesbian coparent to 
maintain a relationship with her child(ren). But they have 
fallen short of the mark. The equitable remedies discussed 
above only encompass the issues of custody and visitation.130 
None of these equitable doctrines has been used to 
adjudicate the lesbian cop arent's maternity or to establish 
Draft No.3 Part I 1998». While the ALI Principles provide guidance for courts 
engaged in a best interests analysis of custody and visitation, the category of de 
facto parent, in itself, does not provide jurisdiction of a lesbian coparent dispute 
nor does it permit a maternity adjudication. The biological parent remains in a 
superior position, even if she did not have the primary caretaking 
responsibilities. 
128. 711 N.E. 2d at 893. 
129. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
130. As discussed above, these equitable remedies do not equalize the 
biological parent and lesbian coparent. See supra note 127 and accompanying 
text. 
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legal parity between the lesbian coparent and her former 
partner. 
For example, in Holtzman v. Knott, despite facts 
indicating that Holtzman functioned as every bit the child's 
mother as her former partner, she was stripped of her 
functional parental status and relegated to third party 
status by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The parent-like 
relationship test did not establish legal parity between 
Holtzman and Knott; it merely allowed Holtzman access to 
a child whom she helped to raise. Similarly, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in V.C. v. M.J.B. limited the utility of the 
psychological parent doctrine. Unlike a situation in which 
both caretakers have legal parental recognition and may be 
awarded joint or shared custody, under the psychological 
parent doctrine lesbian coparents are merely earning the 
right to visit with the children that they have helped to 
raise, but are not likely to be awarded the right to continue 
raising those children. And, similarly, children who were 
raised for several years by two parents are being denied the 
right to continue having their lesbian coparent function in 
that capacity. 
These equitable doctrine decisions are Pyrrhic victories 
for lesbian coparents; under the parent-like relationship, 
psychological parent, and de facto parent doctrines, lesbian 
coparents still occupy an inferior legal status as compared 
to their former partners. 131 Third party visitation doctrine 
would be better exercised, and provide better security for 
children and their lesbian coparents, if it were used within 
the context of the UP A to establish legal parenthood and 
not merely a "parent-like status." In order to confer upon 
lesbian coparents a full range of legal rights, courts must 
look beyond third party visitation doctrine and move to a 
parental analytic framework. 132 By so doing, courts will 
equalize the rights of the biological and nonbiological 
lesbian mothers. Furthermore, courts will thereby protect 
the children as well, ensuring that children of lesbian 
parents benefit from two legal parents. 
Third party visitation doctrine also inadequately 
resolves the issue of standing, the legal basis upon which a 
lesbian coparent may bring her custody and visitation 
131. See Robson, supra note 37, at 1402; see also supra note 110 and 
accompanying text. 
132. Robson, supra note 37, at 1398. 
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claim. Because courts have not often recognized a statutory 
basis upon which lesbian coparents can maintain their 
claims, they have relied on the equitable principles 
discussed above both as a mechanism for determining 
whether the petitioner has standing to bring her claim and 
to decide the merits of the claim. By conflating the issues of 
standing and merits, courts do little to clarify the legal 
process for future petitioners. As noted concerning E.N.O. v. 
L.L.M., "by defining the de facto parent standard as an 
aspect of the substantive best interests analysis, rather 
than as a procedural standing requirement, the E.N. O. 
court neither explicitly extended nor limited the possible 
extension of parental standing rights to lesbian 
coparents.,,133 The court did not differentiate its standing 
analysis from its analysis of the merits, leaving unclear the 
specific circumstances under which a lesbian coparent may 
petition for custody and visitation with her child. The 
Massachussetts Supreme Judicial Court left to the state's 
probate courts the task of determining whether a petitioner 
is a de facto parent before determining whether the 
petitioner has the right to bring a visitation or custody 
claim. 
Similarly, the Holtzman court subsumed its four-
pronged parent-like relationship test within a best interest 
analysis, and never specifically identified upon what legal 
basis a lesbian co parent has standing to file an action for 
ongoing visitation or custody with her child.134 In framing 
the issue before the court as "whether the circuit court 
should exercise its equitable powers to consider Holtzman's 
claim that visitation is in the child's best interest,"135 the 
Holtzman court proceeded with a best interests/merits 
analysis on the presumption that Holtzman had standing to 
pursue her claim under equity principles; but the court did 
not clearly articulate a standing rule applicable to future 
petitioners. Rather, the court applied a circular analysis by 
fusing the best interests analysis and the procedural 
standing requirement: before the court will hear the 
petition, the petitioner must establish the parent-like 
133. Family Law-Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Upholds Probate 
Court's Exercise of Equity Power in Granting Visitation Between a Child and a 
Lesbian De Facto Parent, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1551, 1555 (2000). 
134. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419,435-36 (Wis. 1995). 
135. [d. at 434 (emphasis added). 
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relationship-the same test that affects her rights to 
visitation with her child. 
Unlike the E.N.D. and Holtzman courts, the V.C. court 
noted that it had jurisdiction to hear V.C.'s complaint under 
a New Jersey visitation statute, but did not base 
jurisdiction on the statute alone, since V.C. had made no 
allegation of M.J.B.'s unfitness. Instead, the court also used 
the equitable psychological parenthood doctrine to establish 
V.C.'s standing to maintain her custody and visitation 
claim. Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court, too,· has 
inextricably linked the standing and best interests of the 
child analyses, as the psychological parent test is used both 
as a basis for exercising jurisdiction of the complaint and 
for determining whether the petitioner is entitled to 
ongoing visitation by virtue of how "parental" her role was 
during the course of the couple's relationship. 
The decisions in Holtzman, V.C., and E.N.D. imply that 
if the petitioner can overcome the substantive hurdles of a 
best interests analysis, she will also satisfy the standing 
requirement. These courts, however, in thus combining the 
standing and best interests analyses, leave ambiguous their 
position on standing because they have neither clearly 
articulated a standard nor provided sufficient guidance for 
future litigants. Additionally, these courts leave ambiguous 
what likelihood, if any, a lesbian coparent has to maintain a 
relationship with her child. A uniform and consistent 
approach by courts to lesbian coparent disputes, such as 
using the UP A, would clarify standing issues and assist 
lesbian co parents in maintaining a parental relationship 
with their children. 
III. APPLYING THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT TO LESBIAN 
COPARENTS 
The parental analytic framework regularly applies in 
divorce and paternity cases. While predicated on a one 
mother/one father model, the parental framework can and 
should be applied to nontraditional families, regardless of 
the sex of the parents. Just as second-parent adoption has 
been used to establish two legal parents of the same sex, so, 
too, can the UP A be applied. The purpose of the UP A is to 
provide substantive legal equality for all children by 
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protecting the rights of children born out of wedlock.136 The 
1973 Act codified the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and lower courts throughout the country at the time-a 
recognition that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution mandates equal treatment for children born in 
or out of wedlock.137 Why ~hen, shouldn't an Act designed to 
protect children born of unmarried heterosexual parents be 
applied to children of lesbian couples, specifically to 
adjudicate the maternity of nonbiological, non adoptive 
lesbian coparents? 
A. Who Is a Parent Under the Uniform Parentage Act? 
The Uniform Parentage Act has always contemplated 
that "parent" can mean more than a biological or adoptive 
parent. Section 1 of the UP A defines the "parent and child 
relationship" as the "legal relationship existing between a 
child and his natural or adoptive parents."138 The statute's 
use of "natural," rather than "biological," is significant. 
Section 3 of the Act makes this distinction clear: 
[T]he parent and child relationship between a child and (1) the 
natural mother may be established by proof of her having given 
birth to the child, or under this Act; (2) the natural father may be 
established under this Act; (3~ an adoptive parent may be 
established by proof of adoption. 1 9 
By distinguishing relationships founded on biology, 
adoption, or "under this Act," the Act broadens the scope of 
whose parental status can reasonably be adjudicated. 
Specifically, the UPA's language indicates that a non-
biological or nonadoptive parent can indeed be considered a 
"natural" parent under the statute.140 
136. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 289 (2001). 
137. Id. at 378-79. 
138. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 387 (2001). 
139. Id. § 3, 9B U.L.A. at 391-92 (emphasis added). 
140. UPA 2000 continues to recognize that a legal parent may not be a 
biological or adoptive parent. Section 102(14) defines "parent" as "an individual 
who has established a parent-child relationship under Section 201." The 
omission of "biological" or "adoptive" parent within the definition of "parent" 
remains significant: "The mother-child relationship is established between a 
woman and a child by: (1) the woman's having given birth to the child ... ; (2) 
an adjudication of the woman's maternity; [or] (3) adoption of the child by the 
woman." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
HeinOnline -- 50 Buff. L. Rev. 371 2002
2002] ADJUDICATING MATERNITY 371 
For example, the Act long recognized that a certain 
category of nonbiological and non adoptive parents should 
nonetheless be adjudicated as legal parents under the Act: 
presumptive fathers. Under section 4 of UPA 1973, a man 
may be presumed to be a child's father in a number of 
circumstances. 141 Two of these presumptions are illustrative 
By continuing to identify three possible bases of establishing parenthood-
biology, adoption, and adjudication-the Act broadens the scope of whose 
parental status can reasonably be established, and further indicates that a 
lesbian coparent who can prove her de facto or psychological parent status can 
indeed be established a legal parent under the statute. 
141. The text of section 4 ofUPA 1973 reads: 
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if: 
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each 
other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days 
after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of 
invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a 
court; 
(2) before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have 
attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent 
compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be 
declared invalid, and, 
(i) if the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a court, 
the child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days 
after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or 
divorce; or 
(ii) if the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the 
child is born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation; 
(3) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have 
married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized 
in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is 
or could be declared invalid, and 
(i) he has acknowledged his paternity in writing filed with the 
[appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau). 
(ii) with his consent, he is named as the child's father on the child's 
birth certificate, or 
(iii) he is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary 
promise or by court order; 
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child 
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child; or 
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with 
the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau), which shall promptly 
inform the mother of the filing of his acknowledgment, and she does 
not dispute the acknowledgment within a reasonable time after being 
informed thereof, in a writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital 
Statistics Bureau). If another man is presumed under this section to be 
the child's father, acknowledgment may be effected only with the 
written consent of the presumed father or after the presumption has 
been rebutted. 
(b) A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appropri-
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of the adjudication of nonbiological fathers as "legal" 
fathers: those founded on marriage and holding oneself out 
as a father. These paternity presumptions have been 
extensively litigated and courts have consistently 
demonstrated their desire to preserve intact father and 
child relationships.142 One of the strongest legal presump-
tions is that a child born to a married woman is legitimate: 
the woman's husband is presumed the legal father. 143 The 
marital presumption-that the husband was the child's 
father in the absence of proof of impotence, sterility, or non-
access to the wife-was a fundamental principle of English 
common law and protected the legitimacy of children, which 
entitled them to financial support, afforded them 
inheritance rights, and preserved the stability of the 
ate action only by clear and convmcmg evidence. If two or more 
presumptions arise which conflict with each other, the presumption 
which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy 
and logic controls. The presumption is rebutted by a court decree 
establishing paternity of the child by another man. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 393-94 (2001). 
142. The Act (UPA 2000) no longer includes a presumption of "natural" 
fatherhood arising from receiving a child into one's home and holding the child 
out as one's natural child, codified in UPA 1973 at section 4(a)(4). The drafters 
of UPA 2000 have determined that in this age of improved genetic marker 
testing, biological determiners are preferential to merely holding oneself out as 
a father as a more efficient means of adjudicating paternity. However, as 
discussed below, it is questionable whether courts will so easily move to a 
biological preference, because for several decades, courts have established a 
body of case law that relies on this presumption to preserve an existing, 
functional parent child relationship. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying 
text. 
Furthermore, while the drafters of UPA 2000 place greater reliance on 
biology and less reliance on ''holding oneself out" as a parent, this is in direct 
contrast to the position of the American Law Institute, which has promulgated 
Principles governing the allocation of custodial and decision-making 
responsibility for children, and which defines "parent" as a legal parent, parent 
by estoppel, or a de facto parent. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1) (Tent. Draft No.4 2000). A parent by estoppel is defined, 
in part, as someone who holds herself out and accepts full and permanent 
responsibilities as a parent. [d. § 2.03(1)(b). A de facto parent is defined, in part, 
as someone who regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as 
great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived. [d. § 2.03(1)(c). 
This emphasis on functional parenthood within the ALI Principles further 
serves to reinforce the necessity of looking beyond biology in parentage 
disputes. 
143. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC 'RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES § 4.4 (2d ed. West 1988). For a thorough discussion of the evolution of 
the marital presumption in paternity see generally Glennon, supra note 8. 
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family.144 The preservation of family integrity through the 
marital presumption was upheld in the Supreme Court's 
well-publicized decision of Michael H. v. Gerald D.145 
In Michael H., a biological father sought to establish his 
paternity over the objections of the biological mother and 
her husband, to whom she was married at the time of 
conception.146 In upholding California's conclusive marital 
presumption of paternity, the Court held that allowing 
Michael H.'s claim would undermine family integrity, in 
contrast to a situation where a husband or wife may raise 
the issue of illegitimacy. 147 The Court noted that Michael H. 
did not merely seek to have himself declared the child's 
father, but to "obtain parental prerogatives.,,148 However, 
the Court concluded that where the child "is born into an 
extant marital family, the natural father's unique 
opportunity [to develop a relationship with his child] 
conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the 
husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for 
the State to give categorical preference to the latter."149 
The critical underpinning of the marital presumption is 
the importance of preserving an intact family unit and 
existing parent-child relationships. The doctrine of 
equitable estoppel similarly fosters family stability and 
integrity. Estoppel is sometimes used in conjunction with 
the marital presumption, to prevent a married man from 
illegitimizing the child he held out as his own.150 Estoppel 
may also used by courts to prevent a man from attempting 
144. Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth Is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 70 (2000). 
145. 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1988). 
146. Id. at 113-16. 
147. Id. at 129 & n. 7. In most jurisdictions today, the marital presumption 
is largely rebuttable, placing the burden of proving the husband's non-paternity 
on the moving party, often the wife or the biological, putative father. See CLARK, 
supra note 143, at 191 & n.33. 
148. 491 U.S. at 126. 
149. Id. at 129. 
150. E.g., Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904,910 (Vt. 1998) (holding that former 
husband could not seek to disestablish paternity six years after divorce 
proceedings, despite his recent ascertainment of facts which led him to believe 
he was not child's biological father, because "[wlhere the presumptive father 
has held himself out as the child's parent, and engaged in an ongoing parent-
child relationship for a period of years, he may not disavow that relationship 
and destroy a child's long-held assumptions, solely for his own self-interest"). 
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to disestablish his paternity based on a lack of biological 
connection to a child that he held out as his own.151 
Despite advances in genetic testing, the notion of 
functional parenthood is still an important factor in 
paternity adjudications, as demonstrated in a recent Ohio 
decision. In Crago v. Kinzie , 152 a man who had functioned 
and held himself out as the father of two children for almost 
a decade sought to disestablish his paternity after the 
children's mother sought child support. 153 The record 
demonstrated that he and the mother had lived together as 
"man and wife," although they were not married; that he 
listed himself as the children's father on their respective 
birth certificates; and that the children bore his surname.154 
The court phrased the determinative issue as follows: "Did 
the putative father take some action or refrain from taking 
some action that he reasonably should have taken, which 
gave rise to a conclusion, reasonably relied upon by the 
children, the mother, or the public, which now precludes 
him from attempting to establish the contrary of that 
conclusion ?,,155 
The court concluded "yes": by holding himself out and 
functioning as the children's father for nearly ten years, he 
was prevented by the doctrine of estoppel from seeking 
genetic marker testing which might disprove his pater-
nity.156 The court stressed the importance of "finality" over 
"perfection,,157 and noted the importance of the children's 
reliance on his paternity for their financial and emotional 
well-being, which militated against his interest in 
disproving his paternity.15s 
151. E.g., In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 495-96 (Mass. 2001) 
(holding that nonbiological father was barred from asserting non-paternity of 
child he held out as his own and financially supported for more than five years 
before challenging his paternity on grounds that genetic tests revealed he was 
not child's biological father). The court stated that "[wlhere a father and child 
have a substantial parent-child relationship ... and the father has provided the 
child with consistent emotional and financial support, an attempt to undo a 
determination of paternity is 'potentially devastating to a child who ha[sl 
considered the man to be the father.'" Id. at 495. 
152. 733 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (Ohio Ct. Com. PI. 2000). 
153. Id. at 1223. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1228. 
157. Id. at 1226. 
158. Id. at 1233. The court noted that equity may preclude consideration of 
genetic testing: 
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The Michael H. and Crago. courts determined that 
undoing an existing parent-child relationship is potentially 
devastating to a child who has lived with the knowledge 
and reliance that a certain man is her father. Similarly, 
excising a loving mother from a child's life because of her 
lack of biological (hence, legal) connection to the child 
carries the same potentially disastrous consequences, as 
most poignantly expressed in Micah's story. The marital 
presumption and estoppel have been successfully used to 
maintain the father-child relationship in the absence of a 
biological tie because courts know that children rely on 
established parent-child relationships. Undoing that 
relationship does more than remove a source of child 
support from the child's life; it causes a lack of security and 
stability in the child's life. 
The principles on which these presumptions are 
founded include stability for the child, maintaining an 
existing parent and child relationship, and ensuring that 
the child will continue to reap the benefits, particularly the 
financial benefits, of having two legal parents. Applying 
these principles to preserve familial relationships 
demonstrates that functioning as parent-socially, 
emotionally, financially-is more important than biological 
or adoptive connection to the child. And applying these 
principles has rendered a nonbiological or nonadoptive 
(heterosexual) parent a legal parent under the UPA. These 
principles are equally applicable to lesbian coparents. Thus, 
the issue of UPA application to lesbian coparents becomes 
not one of legal theory but social practice. Courts certainly 
recognize the importance of preserving the integrity of an 
existing father and child relationship. Courts have not been 
so willing to preserve the integrity of a relationship 
between a lesbian coparent and her child. 159 
With the advent and widespread availability of genetic testing, it is 
tempting for putative fathers to assume that their exclusion as the 
biological father of a child through such testing will necessarily 
extinguish their duty of parental support. Putative fathers who make 
this erroneous assumption may learn that the... rules of equity 
render their disestablishment efforts for naught. 
Id. at 1230. 
159. E.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing 
to apply equitable estoppel to find lesbian coparent a "parent" under statute 
and declining to award her visitation with child); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 
Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that equitable estoppel could not be used 
to establish lesbian coparent's legal parentage). 
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The one mother/one father model pervades family law 
doctrine and continues to serve as the biggest hurdle in 
adjudicating maternity for lesbian coparents. For example, 
in discussing the difficulties of obtaining legal recognition 
for lesbian coparents, Professor Polikoff observed that 
Michael H. reinforces the state's interest "in assuring that 
every child has neither more nor less than one mother and 
one father.,,16o Similarly, in analyzing the application of 
third party doctrine to lesbian coparents, Professor 
Ruthann Robson observed that "[t]he lesbian nonlegal 
mother. .. challenges the heterosexual matrix of third 
party custody by being the 'other' mother in an ideology 
that acknowledges only one mother, the third party in an 
ideology that admits of only two parents, one of each 
gender. ,,161 
But in keeping stride with social trends, our laws-and 
application of our laws-must adaRt to fit scenarios that 
were not previously contemplated. I 2 As Professor Polikoff 
wrote more than a decade ago: 
When parents create a nontraditional family, that family becomes 
the reality of the child's life. The child may experience some 
stigma, but courts should delegitimize, not condone, disparaging 
community attitudes. The courts should protect children's 
interests within the context of nontraditional families, rather than 
attempt to eradicate such families by adhering to a fictitious, 
homogeneous family model,163 
Approximately ten million children are being raised by 
same-sex parents.164 These children should be protected by 
our courts, not punished. The concerns that prompted the 
implementation of the UPA and its parental presump-
tions-the need to provide financial and emotional 
protection for a child born to unmarried heterosexual 
parents-are equally applicable to children born to 
unmarried lesbian parents, and the same legal analysis 
should apply. 
160. Polikoff, supra note 7, at 479. 
161. Robson, supra note 37, at 1391-92. 
162. Courts have been able to relax the rigidity of the one mother/one father 
model in permitting same-sex second parent adoptions; the same movement 
away from the traditional model should apply to UPA maternity adjudication 
for lesbian coparents. 
163. Polikoff, supra note 7, at 482. 
164. See Kellogg, supra note 2, at B10. 
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Lesbian coparents should be able to obtain parentage 
adjudications under the UPA just as nonbiological fathers 
can and do. The text of the Act seems to lend itself to such 
an application. The UPA includes a provision for a 
declaration of maternity, which provides a statutory basis 
upon which lesbian coparents can pursue their custody and 
visitation claims: section 21 of the Act provides that "[a]ny 
interested party may bring an action to determine the 
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relation-
ship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this Act 
applicable to the father and child relationship apply.,,165 
Read in conjunction with section 3, which permits the 
establishment of a mother and child relationship "under 
this Act" and not just on biology or adoption/66 section 21 
can be used to adjudicate a lesbian coparent's maternity.167 
Using the equitable doctrines of de facto or 
psychological parenthood or equitable estoppel can assist 
the court in making determinations of whether the 
petitioner has truly acted as a parent, deserving of 
parentage adjudication. However, by applying these equi-
table doctrines within the broader statutory framework, 
courts will do more than make piecemeal resolutions of 
visitation disputes: courts will preserve the integrity of 
relationships between lesbian coparents and their children, 
just as they have for heterosexual fathers. 
B. The Lesbian Coparent Cases 
The issue of whether the Act should apply to lesbian 
coparents has been litigated for more than a decade. While 
early cases held that the Act should not be applied to 
nonbiological or nonadoptive mothers, recent cases have 
properly begun to apply the Act to lesbian coparents and 
other "nontraditional" parents. These recent cases illustrate 
a better judicial understanding of our societal move from a 
165. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 334 (2001). 
166. Id. § 3, 9B U.L.A. at 391-92. 
167. Similarly, section 106 ofUPA 2000 states that "[p]rovisions of this [Act] 
relating to determination of paternity apply to determinations of maternity." 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (2000). Read in conjunction with section 201, which 
permits the establishment of a mother and child relationship by an adjudication 
of the woman's maternity and not just by birth or adoption, and section 602, 
which authorizes standing for a woman whose maternity is to be adjudicated, 
UPA 2000 can be used to establish a lesbian cop arent's maternity. Id. §§ 201, 
602. 
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one mother/one father model of family to other models, 
including same-sex parent families. 
1. The "Traditional" Paradigm. One of the first cases 
to address whether the UPA can be used to adjudicate the 
maternity of a lesbian coparent was Curiale v. Reagan. 168 In 
Curiale, a lesbian couple who had been residing together in 
a committed relationship, decided to have a baby through 
artificial insemination and to both raise the child.169 While 
the defendant Reagan gave birth to the child, Curiale 
provided the sole financial support for the family.170 The 
couple's relationship ended three years after their child's 
birth, at which time the couple executed a written 
agreement which provided, inter alia, for the sharing of 
physical custody of the child.l7l Six months later, Reagan 
informed Curiale that she was no longer willing to share 
custody of the child and further, that Curiale could no 
longer visit with the child.172 Curiale subsequently filed a 
complaint to "'establish de facto parent status/maternity 
and for custody and visitation."'173 The trial court held that 
it was without jurisdiction to hear Curiale's claim and that 
there was no statutory basis for her claim of parental 
status. 174 
On appeal, Curiale asserted that one foundation for her 
claim was California Civil Code section 7015, part of 
California's version of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act.175 
The California Court of Appeals for the Third District held 
that, while section 7015 confers standing upon any 
interested person to bring an action to determine the 
existence of a parent-child relationship, "it has no appli-
cation where, as here, it is undisputed that the defendant is 
168. 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990). 
169. Id. at 521. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 522. 
175. Id. Section 7015 of the California Family Code provided that "[a]ny 
interested person may bring an action to determine the existence or 
nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable, the 
provisions of this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply." 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7015, repealed by CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West 2001). Section 
7650 continues former § 7015 without change. 
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the natural mother of the child.,,176 The court engaged in no 
further discussion of the UP A, but implied by its ruling that 
the maternity provision could apply only to a child's 
biological mother.177 The Curiale decision did not adequately 
address the reality of the family unit before it, nor did it act 
in the child's best interest in denying the lesbian coparent 
legal recourse to maintain an existing parent-child 
relationship. 
Less than a year later, the California Court of Appeals 
for the First District was presented with the issue of 
whether the UP A conferred standing upon a lesbian 
coparent seeking custody of her nonbiological children.178 
The parties in Nancy S. v. Michele G. began living together 
in 1969 and had a commitment ceremony several months 
later.179 The parties decided to have children and in June 
1980, the respondent, Nancy S., gave birth to the parties' 
first child, a daughter.18o Four years laters Nancy S. gave birth to the parties' second child, a son. I I Both children 
were given Michele G.'s family name and she was listed as 
the "father" on both children's birth certificates.182 
A year after the birth of their son, the parties separated 
and they agreed that their daughter would live with 
Michele G. and that their son would live with Nancy S.183 
They arranged visitation so that each party would have 
primary care of one child for five days during the week, but 
the children would be together, at either parent's home, 
four days a week.184 After three years, Nancy S. wanted to 
change the agreement so that each parent would have 
custody of both children 50% of the time, but Michele G. 
opposed any change.185 Nancy S. then commenced a 
proceeding under the UPA, seeking a declaration that she 
176. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
177. The California Supreme Court now recognizes that the term "mother" 
under the UPA encompasses more than a biological mother and has opened the 
door for lesbian coparent maternity adjudication. See discussion infra Part 
III.B.2. 
178. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991). 
179. [d. at 214. 
180. [d. 
18l. [d. 
182. [d. 
183. [d. 
184. [d. By alternating with which parent the children reside, this 
seemingly mathematical feat can indeed be accomplished. 
185. [d. 
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was entitled to sole legal and physical custody of the 
children, that Michele G. was not a parent of either child, 
and that Michele G. could visit the children only with her 
consent. 186 
Michele G. conceded that she was not a biological or 
adoptive "natural" parent under the UP A, but asserted that 
the Act did not provide an exclusive definition of 
parenthood and advanced several equitable theories 
pursuant to which the court might consider her a parent: de 
facto parenthood, in loco parentis, parenthood by equitable 
estoppel, and functional parenthood. 187 Professor Robson 
noted that "[a]ll of these theories supported the proposition 
that Michelle [sic] G. should be deemed a parent, therebla 
forestalling the operation of third party doctrine."l 8 
However, the Nancy S. court, concerned that application of 
the doctrines would give Michele a parental status that did 
not exist under California's statutory laws refused to apply 
equitable doctrines to protect Michele G.19 And, unlike the 
courts discussed in Part II that were willing to apply 
equitable doctrine to resolve at least the issue of visitation, 
the Nancy S. court refused to apply any third party 
doctrine, thereby denying Michele G. any legal right to 
continue a parental relationship with her children. The 
court's unwillingness to apply anyone of four equitable 
doctrines to Michele demonstrates its reluctance to move 
beyond the one mother/one father paradigm and to view 
family in terms of two same-sex parents. 
Refusing to recognize Michele's parental status, the 
court reinforced Michele's third party "legal stranger" 
status in its application of each parental theory. The court 
held that de facto parenthood and in loco parentis status do 
not overcome the hurdles of parental autonomy, noting that 
the doctrine of de facto ~arenthood is most often used if the 
natural parent is unfit 90 and that the concept of in loco 
186. Id. Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) has drafted 
standards helpful for resolving custodial disputes between former same-sex 
partners. GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, PROTECTING FAMILIES: 
STANDARDS FOR CHILD CUSTODY IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS (1999), available at 
http://www.glad.org/Publications/CiviIRightProject/protectingfamilies.pdf. 
187. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215-16. 
188. Robson, supra note 37, at 1396. 
189. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216-19. 
190. Id. at 216. But see V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 2000) 
(recognizing that someone who has acted as a psychological parent may assert a 
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parentis has generally been used to impose certain rights 
and obligations of legal parents on those in a parent-like 
relationship with children, but had never been extended to 
custodial disputes. 191 The court further noted that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel has generally been used to 
preclude a man from denying paternity for the purpose of 
avoiding his support obligations. 192 Although equitable 
estoppel has also been used to preserve a parental relation-
ship in the absence of a biological tie, the court refused to 
analogize the situation of the lesbian coparent with a 
nonbiological putative father.193 Finally, in refusing also to 
recognize the notion of functional parenthood, the court 
agreed that the absence of any legal formalization of 
Michele's relationship with the children was "tragic," but it 
refused to find that the Act permits an expansive definition 
of parent-mainly out of concern that such an expansion 
could "expose other natural parents to litigation brought by 
child-care providers of long standing, relatives, successive 
sets of stepparents or other close friends of the family."194 
The court not only precluded the adjudication of a 
mother and child relationship by finding that the four 
equitable theories were inapplicable, it precluded Michele 
G. from maintaining any parental relationship with her 
children. Clearly, the court was concerned about the impact 
its decision would have on the children involved, but it 
refused to de~art from a formalistic approach to statutory 
construction.15 Notably, as in Curiale, the Nancy S. court 
custody and visitation claim even if she does not allege the biological parent's 
unfitness). 
191. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217 ("The concept of 'in loco parentis,' 
however, has never been applied in a custody dispute to give a nonparent the 
same rights as a parent, and we are unpersuaded that the concept should be so 
extended."). 
192. Id. at 217. 
193. See id. at 217-18 (distinguishing equitable estoppel from an "equitable 
parent" theory). The reluctance to apply doctrines such as estoppel to lesbian 
coparents exemplifies the courts unwillingness to consider that a child may 
have two parents of the same gender. See supra text accompanying notes 160-
63. 
194. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
195. See id. ("By deferring to the Legislature in matters involving complex 
social and policy ramifications far beyond the facts of the particular case, we are 
not telling the parties that the issues they raise are unworthy of legal 
recognition. To the contrary, we intend only to illustrate the limitations of the 
courts in fashioning a comprehensive solution to such a complex and socially 
significant issue."). 
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appeared wary of adjudicating the maternity of a 
nonbiological mother. By finding no legal parental relation-
ship between Micah and Michele, the court denied Micah 
his mother and forfeited his right to parental protection. As 
noted in the preface to this article, Micah knew that he 
continued to have a second mother and begged for her 
protection after his accident. By denying Michele and Micah 
any legalization of their relationship, the Nancy S. court's 
decision made Micah an orphan-more of a tragedy than it 
ever could have foreseen in its opinion.196 
2. New Decision-Making for New Times. The California 
Supreme Court opened the door to nonbiological maternity 
adjudication in its 1993 decision, Johnson v. Calvert. 197 In 
Johnson, the court was confronted with determining who is 
a "mother" under California's version of the UPA, as 
between the egg donor/genetic mother or the birth mother. 
The court concluded that both women had a legitimate 
factual basis upon which to assert their maternity198 and 
that both women "adduced evidence of a mother and child 
relationship as contemplated by the Act."l99 Based on the 
court's determination that both women could assert mater-
nity under the Act, the court reviewed the parties' intent to 
determine who should be adjudicated the legal mother. 
Because the genetic mother had, with her husband, 
contracted for the birth mother to act as surrogate, the 
court determined that the intent of the genetic mother to 
actually parent the child was more compelling than the 
196. Ultimately, Michele was able to convince social services workers in 
Oklahoma to permit her to bring Micah home and she became his legal 
guardian. See Herscher, supra note 1. 
197. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); see also Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a couple who had arranged 
for the birth of a child through donor insemination and a surrogate mother were 
in fact the child's legal parents, despite the absence of any biological connection 
to the child, because the child would not have been born "but for the efforts of 
the intended parents") (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782). 
198. The court found that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that one 
woman gave birth to the child and one woman is genetically related to the child, 
thus rendering both women "mother" under the Act. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781. 
199. Id. Concluding that both women had valid claims for maternity under 
the Act, the court relied on California Civil Code section 7003, which provides in 
relevant part, that between a child and the natural mother a parent and child 
relationship "may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child, 
or under [the Actl." Id. at 780 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (2001» 
(emphasis added). 
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surrogate's gestation of the child.200 The court specifically 
noted that it declined to find that the child had two 
mothers, because that would vest parental rights in a third 
party and disrupt a "stable, intact, and nurturing home.,,201 
As one author, however, has written: 
[T]he court left open the possibility that-faced with compelling 
reasons-recognition of two mothers could be appropriate in some 
future situation. In addition, it elevated intent of the parties over 
literal interpretation of the statute, holding that 'intentions that 
are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained for 
ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood.'202 
Attorneys Minter and Kendell of the National Center for 
Lesbian Rights similarly agree that the parties' intentions 
to coparent a child were of paramount importance in the 
Johnson case and that intention to coparent provides a solid 
foundation upon which lesbian coparents can seek 
adjudication under the UPA.203 In fact, several California 
courts agree with this broader reading of the UP A: a 
number of county courts have granted UPA petitions to 
nonbiological lesbian coparents, thereby adjudicating their 
legal motherhood.204 
3. A State Supreme Court Recognizes the Applicability 
of the Uniform Parentage Act to a Lesbian Coparent. In its 
September 2000 decision in Rubano v. DiCenzo, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court became the first state court of last 
resort to approve the use of the UPA as a means of 
exercising jurisdiction over a lesbian coparent dispute and 
adjudicating maternity for a lesbian coparent.205 Although 
at the trial court level the lesbian coparent petitioner 
waived her claim seeking adjudication of a mother and child 
200. Id. at 781-82. 
201. [d. at 781 n.8. 
202. Doskow, supra note 57, at 18 (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783). 
203. See Minter & Kendell, supra note 50, at 41-42. The authors have 
prepared a model brief which contains a good analysis of how courts, 
particularly those in California, can use Johnson to adjudicate maternity for 
lesbian coparents. [d. at 38-47. In their model brief, the authors argue that 
under the holding in Johnson, a lesbian coparent is a lawful parent because she 
consented to the biological mother's artificial insemination in order "to bring 
about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own." Id. at 38. 
204. [d. at 32. 
205. 759 A.2d 959 (R.1. 2000). 
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relationship, the Rubano court noted in its decision that the 
petitioner could have so requested, thus opening the door to 
lesbian coparent adjudication and a more definite 
resolution of lesbian co parent disputes.206 Rubano marks a 
significant step forward in lesbian coparent jurisprudence, 
by recognizing that a non biological or nonadoptive mother 
can be adjudicated a legal parent nonetheless. 
The parties in Rubano, Maureen Rubano and Concetta 
DiCenzo, entered into a committed relationship in 1988.207 
Eventually, they set up a household as domestic partners 
and in 1991 they decided to have and raise a child 
together. 208 The parties decided that DiCenzo would be 
artificially inseminated, and in 1992 she gave birth to a son 
whose last name was listed on both his birth and baptismal 
certificates as Rubano-DiCenzo.209 Rubano never ado~ted 
him, but for four years the couple co parented the child. 0 In 
1996, the couple separated and the parties established an 
informal visitation schedule for Rubano to see her son. But 
by 1997, DiCenzo opposed the visits and Rubano filed a 
petition in family court seeking to establish her de facto 
parental status and to obtain court-ordered visitation.2l1 
After Rubano filed the lawsuit, and subsequent to the 
appointment and recommendations of a guardian ad litem, 
the parties negotiated a consent order which provided that 
Rubano was to have permanent visitation with her child in 
exchange for which she agreed to waive any claim she had 
or may have to recognition as a parent of her son.212 Their 
agreement was subsequently entered as an order of the 
206. Id. at 967. The court stated: 
[T]he plain language of this provision of the ULP [Rhode Island version 
of the UPA] vests the Family Court with jurisdiction to declare the 
existence vel non of a mother and child relationship in these limited 
circumstances. . .. Indeed, if the parties had chosen to litigate this 
issue rather than to settle their dispute and if the facts were contrary 
to what Rubano had alleged, the ULP expressly allowed for a finding 
that no mother and child relationship existed between Rubano and the 
child; but, in any event, there is no question but that § 15-8-26 [of the 
ULP] gives the Family Court jurisdiction to determine whether such a 
relationship exists in cases like this one. . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
207. Id. at 961. 
208.Id. 
209.Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 961-62. 
212. Id. at 962. 
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family court.213 Soon thereafter, DiCenzo allegedly violated 
the visitation agreement again and Rubano sought 
contempt relief under the family court order.214 DiCenzo 
countered that the family court could not enforce the 
visitation order because the court had lacked jurisdiction to 
enter the order in the first place.215 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court disagreed, and held 
that Rubano had several remedies available to her and that 
the family court indeed had jurisdiction to hear Rubano's 
complaint for contempt as well as her initial petition.216 
First, and most importantly, the court held that the family 
court had jurisdiction to hear Rubano's original petition to 
determine the existence of a de facto parental relationship 
under section 15-8-26 of Rhode Island's Uniform Law on 
Paternity ("ULP,,).217 Section 15-8-26 provides that "[a]ny 
interested party may bring an action to determine the 
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child 
relationship.,,218 The court found that Rubano qualified as 
an interested party because she claimed that she had a de 
facto parental relationship with her son.219 Second, in 
addition to the maternity provision of the ULP, the Rubano 
court concluded that Rubano was entitled to pursue her 
visitation claim under the state's general paternity 
statute.220 The court also concluded that Rubano had a claim 
against DiCenzo for violating the parties' visitation 
agreement. 
In recognizing Rubano's right to pursue her claim under 
section 15-8-26, the court made several important legal 
conclusions. Unlike the California courts in Curiale and 
Michele G., the Rubano court acknowledged that a 
biological connection to a child is not a prerequisite to 
seeking a maternity adjudication under the maternity 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 962-63. 
215. Id. at 963. 
216. Id. at 966. 
217. Rhode Island's Uniform Law on Paternity is a hybrid version of the 
Uniform Act on Paternity and the Uniform Parentage Act. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 
966. 
218. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-8-26 (2000) (emphasis added); Rubano, 759 A.2d at 
966. Section 15-8-26 adopts verbatim the language of the maternity provision 
contained in section 21 of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act. 
219. 759 A.2d at 966-67 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-10-3). 
220. Id. at 970. 
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provision of the ULP (or the UPA).221 Relying on its previous 
decision in Pettinato v. Pettinato,222 the Rubano court noted 
that the family court has the power to determine the 
existence of a de facto parent-child relationship, despite the 
absence of a biological connection between the child and 
putative parent. 223 The court ruled that "any interested 
party" under section 15-8-26 may include a person "who, 
though he or she has no biological connection with a child, 
nonetheless has functioned as a parent in relation to that 
child and has been held out to the community as the child's 
parent by the biological parent."224 
The Rubano court engaged in a critical analysis of 
section 15-8-26, the language of which is identical to the 
UP A 1973 maternity provision. The court specifically noted 
that while other provisions of the parentage act include 
various forms of limiting language,225 section 15-8-26 
contains no such limiting provisions, "thereby allowing a 
nonbiological parent to establish the existence of a de facto 
mother-child relationship with the child.,,226 The dissent's 
contention was that the ULP's maternity provision was 
enacted solely for the rare case where a young child may 
not know his or her mother and that it does not permit 
someone who already knows who a child's biological mother 
is "to intrude upon an already established biological mother 
and child relationship." In contrast, the majority found no 
such limiting language within section 15_8_26:227 
[I]f the General Assembly had intended to permit only a biological 
mother or a child living with a single father or in a foster home to 
bring an action to determine the existence of a mother and child 
relationship, we are of the opinion that it would have said so 
instead of using the broader term "[a]ny interested party." A 
biological connection with either the mother or the child is but one 
221. Id. at 968. 
222. 582 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1990) (awarding custodial rights of minor child to 
nonbiological father based upon his status as a de facto parent). 
223. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 967. 
224. Id. at 969. The court specifically noted that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel barred DiCenzo from asserting that Rubano's lack of a biological tie to 
the child was fatal to Rubano's claim for legal recognition of her rights as a de 
facto parent. Id. at 968. 
225. For example, the court referred to section 15-8-3(a), which delineates 
specific circumstances under which a man is presumed to be a child's natural 
father.ld. 
226. Id. at 969. 
227. Id. at 980 (Bourcier, J. dissenting). 
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potential source of an interest sufficient to confer standing on a 
person seeking to obtain a judicial determination concerning the 
existence of a mother-child relationship. Thus ... the language of 
§ 15-8-26 does not specifically limit its scope to those interested in 
determining a biological mother-and-child relationship.228 
Thus, in Rubano,· the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
became the first court of last resort to recognize what the 
broad language of the UP A allows: a lesbian coparent with 
no biological or adoptive connection to her child may indeed 
be a legal parent under the statute and proceed with a 
petition to establish maternity. 
However, although the court noted that "any interested 
party" may petition to establish the existence of a mother 
and child relationship, it narrowly construed "any 
interested party," requiring an alleged parent-like relation-
ship with the child before relief can be granted. 229 While this 
may appear to implicate the problems noted in the third 
party equitable doctrine cases, the significant difference 
between the cases is clear: the basis for standing, namely 
the UPA. In the equitable doctrine cases, the issues of 
standing and proof of a parent-like relationship were 
inextricably intertwined, resulting in an unclear process 
and result. Under a Rubano analysis, however, while the 
lesbian coparent must establish a parent-like relationship 
to sustain her maternity claim, it appears she need only 
disclose in the petition that she has such a relationship; she 
can prove the merits of her parental relationship as part of 
her case-in-chief seeking a maternity determination. 
Furthermore, the context in which she must establish 
her de facto parental status differs between Rubano and the 
previous third party equitable doctrine cases. Rubano 
definitely suggests that proof of a de facto parental 
relationship can result in an adjudication of maternity; the 
third party equitable doctrine cases merely allowed for 
ongoing visitation upon proof of a de facto parental 
relationship. As previously discussed, maternity adjudica-
tion greatly impacts other considerations, such as custody 
228. [d. at 969-70 (emphasis added). 
229. [d. at 967. In clarifying its narrow interpretation of "any interested 
party," the court distinguishes its decision in Rubano from the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), which held that a 
Washington statute that permitted "any person" to petition for visitation at 
"any time" was unconstitutionally broad. 
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and visitation, and creates a legal parity between the 
parties that third party doctrine cannot. Moreover, mater-
nity adjudication provides the greatest security for the child 
of a lesbian coparent. 
Rubano does not stand for the proposition that third 
party equitable doctrine should be completely overlooked. 
As discussed above, Rubano must prove her de facto 
parental status in order to be adjudicated as a legal parent 
under section 15-8-26. Thus, traditional third party 
equitable doctrines still play an integral role in a maternity 
adjudication, because they provide a means for evaluating 
the parental role that a lesbian coparent has played in the 
life of her child; however, this evaluation occurs within a 
parental analytic framework. Rubano did not begin from 
the premise that the biological parent is the only parent 
and that the lesbian co parent is a legal stranger. Instead, 
the court properly treated both parties as parents within its 
analysis. In recognizing the maternity claim of the lesbian 
coparent, the Rubano court recognizes the societal trend of 
"two mommy" households and is not constrained by 
traditional norms of one mother/one father. 
In fact, the Rubano court further demonstrated its 
willingness to look beyond the one mother/one father 
parentage model by determining that the general paternity 
statute conferred standing for Rubano's visitation claim. 
That statute grants jurisdiction to the family court over 
"those matters relating to adults who shall be involved with 
paternity of children born out of wedlock.,,23o The court 
noted that the statute equally applied to two women: 
While the word 'paternity' implies the 'fathering' of a child, we are 
mindful of the Legislature's instruction that when statutes are 
construed '[e]very word importing the masculine gender only, may 
be construed to extend to and to include females as well as males.' 
Thus, two women may certainly be 'adults who shall be involved 
with paternity' of a child for purposes of this statute.231 
The court found that Rubano was most certainly 
involved with the "paternity" of the child, based on the facts 
recounted above. Although the court did not indicate that 
the general provisions of the paternity statute confer 
standing to adjudicate maternity for Rubano, the provision 
230. Rubano, 759 A.2d. at 970. 
231. [d. at 971 n.13 (citation omitted). 
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does provide a statutory basis for standing upon which she 
could proceed with her visitation claim. Thus, unlike the 
Holtzman, V.C., and E.N.O. courts, which applied third 
party doctrine to exercise standing and to resolve the 
substantive dispute, Rubano found a statutory predicate for 
Rubano's visitation claim and clarified the issue of 
standing. Thus, the Rubano court became the first state 
court of last resort to fully acknowledge the potentiality for 
applying the UP A to lesbian coparents, both as an 
adjudication mechanism and a basis for exercising 
jurisdiction of lesbian coparent disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
Other courts should follow the example of Rubano and 
use the UP A to adjudicate maternity for lesbian coparents. 
Unlike third party equitable doctrines, use of the UPA fully 
resolves the issue of a lesbian cop arent's legal parent status 
and simultaneously provides clarity concerning her stand-
ing to maintain her claim. The UPA provides a consistent, 
uniform means for enabling a lesbian coparent to achieve 
full, legal parental status, which protects her and her child. 
In filing a maternity complaint, petitioners will not run 
afoul of constitutional presumptions of parental autonomy; 
they will not need to allege that the biological parent is 
unfit. Instead, a lesbian coparent can assert that she has a 
parental relationship with her child and use equitable 
doctrines as a means of proving her parentage within a 
parental analytic framework, rather than as a last-ditch 
effort to illustrate a quasi-parental relationship which may 
recognize only some aspects of parentage. 
In this way, the UPA better establishes parity between 
the lesbian coparent and biological mother than either a 
second-parent adoption or a traditional equity complaint, 
because under a UPA complaint, the petitioner argues that 
she is a parent to her child, not that she has assumed a 
quasi-parental role in the child's life.232 Essentially, this 
type of proceeding puts lesbian coparents on a par with men 
engaged in paternity proceedings and parents engaged in 
divorce proceedings: the focus is properly placed on 
determining how much visitation or contact with the 
lesbian coparent serves the child's best interests, rather 
232. See Doskow, supra note 57, at 21. 
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than whether any contact with the lesbian coparent serves 
the child's best interests or whether such contact violates 
the biological mother's parental rights.233 
Maternity adjudication under the UP A also preempts 
many of the problems noted in the cases discussed above. If 
lesbian coparents had a legal acknowledgment of their 
parental status prior to the dissolution of their relationship, 
it would be simpler to establish the jurisdictional basis for 
filing a custody and visitation complaint.234 Courts in Los 
Angeles, San Luis Obispo, and San Francisco counties in 
California as well as courts in Colorado and Massachusetts 
have granted UPA petitions to establish a legal relationship 
between lesbian coparents and their children, thereby 
protecting the relationship between a lesbian coparent and 
her child even if the lesbian co parent and her partner end 
their romantic relationship.235 
Moreover, under the UPA, lesbian co parents (or 
biological mothers) need not initiate an adversarial 
proceeding: for instance, parties can file a written voluntary 
acknowledgment of parentage with the court in lieu of filing 
a complaint, which would have the same force and effect as 
an adjudication of maternity.236 Filing a maternity petition 
provides absolute protection of the child-parent relationship 
between the child and her lesbian cop arent, now legal 
parent. From a practical standpoint, then, adjudication 
233. Minter and Kendell note that: 
[W]hile lesbian and gay parents who obtain second-parent adoptions 
are relieved to have some means of protecting their children, many also 
resent the notion that it is necessary for one of the partners to adopt 
the child to obtain legal recognition as a parent, despite the fact that 
both partners have planned the birth of the child and assumed co-equal 
responsibilities for parenting. 
Minter & Kendell, supra note 50, at 30. 
234. In all of the lesbian coparent cases discussed, a maternity adjudication 
for the lesbian coparent prior to the dissolution of her relationship with her 
romantic partner would have enabled her to proceed with her custody and 
visitation claims without need for a determination of her right to proceed; her 
legal parentage would have automatically given her that right. 
235. See Doskow, supra note 57, at 21; Minter & Kendell, supra note 50, at 
33 nn.27-28. 
236. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209C, § l1(a) (West 1998). In 
addition to the acknowledgment of parentage, the parties can also file a 
parenting agreement, which reflects their intentions concerning support, 
custody, visitation, and the like. Id. For purposes of establishing maternity, a 
coparenting agreement further exemplifies to the court the parties' joint 
intention to create a "two mommies" family. 
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under the UPA is advantageous for lesbian coparents 
because they can guickly and cheaply resolve the issue of 
legal parenthood.237 
Most significantly, children benefit from lesbian 
coparent maternity adjudication. too. By establishing 
maternity, a lesbian coparent will be able to ensure all of 
the privileges and protections of parenthood for her child, 
such as financial benefits-support, inheritance, health 
insurance-and emotional benefits-a legal ability to get 
involved in her child's educational, medical, moral, and 
religious development. Thus, maternity adjudication under 
the UP A will give children of lesbian parents, like Micah, 
two mommies who can protect and care for them and will 
ensure that children are not separated from the lesbian 
coparents who love them. 
237. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
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